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Center of Main Interests, International
Insolvency Case Venue, and Equality
of Arms: The Eurofood Decision of the
European Court of Justice*

The Honorable Samuel L. Bufford**
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Justice ("E.C.J.") issued a ruling on May 2,
2006 in the Eurofood case, finding that the commencement of an
insolvency case for Eurofood in Ireland gave the Irish court priority under
E.U. law over a similar insolvency case commenced shortly thereafter in
Italy.' The E.C.J.'s ruling responded to the Supreme Court of Ireland's
referral to the E.C.J. of five questions of E.U. law 2 based on the E.U.
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings ("E.U. Regulation").3 The Irish
Supreme Court had referred these questions to the E.C.J. preliminary to
deciding a pending appeal of the Dublin High Court's decision to open a
Copyright Samuel L. Bufford 2006.
** United States Bankruptcy Judge, Central District of California; Nomura Lecturer on
Law, Harvard Law School, winter 2005. B.A., Wheaton College, 1964; Ph.D., University of
Texas, 1969; J.D., University of Michigan, 1973.
1Case 341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm (Under "Cases lodged before the Court of
Justice" follow "Since 1989" hyperlink; then follow "C-341/04" hyperlink). [hereinafter
Eurofood-E.C.J.]. This Article deals with decisions from five courts, all relating to Eurofood
IFSC Ltd. The decision by the Dublin High Court is In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., [2004] No.
33 Dublin H. Ct. [hereinafter Eurofood-Dublin]. The decision on appeal of that decision to
the Irish Supreme Court is In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., [2004] IESC 45 (Ir.) [hereinafter
Eurofood-lreland]. The decision of the court in Parma, Italy is In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd.,
Parma Civil & Criminal Ct., Feb. 19, 2004 (unpublished opinion on file with author), affd,
Trib. Amm. Reg. 10 June 2004, n.6998/2004 (on file with author) [hereinafter EurofoodParma]. The decision of the Italian court of appeal is In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., Trib. Amm.
Reg. 10 June 2004, n.6998/2004 (on file with author) [hereinafter Eurofood-Italy].
2 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 24.
3 Council Regulation 1346/2000, 29 May 2000, on insolvency proceedings, 2000 O.J.
(L 160) 1-18 (as amended) [hereinafter E.U. Regulation].
*
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main insolvency proceeding 4 for Eurofood IFSC, Ltd. ("Eurofood") (a
subsidiary of Parmalat SpA, one of the largest corporate groups in Italy,
which went into insolvency proceedings in Italy on December 24, 2003) in
competition with a parallel main insolvency case for the same entity in
Parma, Italy.5 The two parallel main proceedings arose because courts in
each country, based on different criteria, had decided that Eurofood's center
of main interests ("CoMI") 6 was located in its own country.
The E.C.J. decision is enormously important because it holds that the
CoMI must be determined from the viewpoint of third party creditors and
other parties in interest. 7 In contrast, the decision rejects the view that the
CoMI decision for a corporate subsidiary may be based on the location of
the command and control functions, which, for a subsidiary, may be in the
country where the parent corporation is located.
The E.C.J. decision also addresses (briefly in some cases) three other
extremely important issues under the E.U. Regulation (and in international
insolvency law generally). First, it holds that the "public policy" exception
to international recognition of insolvency decisions in the E.U. Community
must be construed very narrowly. 8 Second, it discusses to a certain extent
the importance of "fair legal process," a very important issue in other
international insolvency cases. 9 Finally, it makes reference to the problem
of the treatment of corporate groups under the E.U. Regulation (which is0
the same under the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
("UNCITRAL Model Law") and its variations as adopted in numerous
countries).
Perhaps the most surprising feature of the decision is the E.C.J.'s
statement that the "equality of arms" principle is particularly important with
respect to the right of creditors or their representatives to participate in
insolvency proceedings." The "equality of arms" principle was altogether
unknown heretofore in insolvency law anywhere in the world. Indeed, it is
essentially unknown in modern common law systems, and in civil law
systems it is largely confined to criminal law and administrative law.

4 According to the language used in the English version of the E.U. Regulation, a
"proceeding" corresponds to a "case" under U.S. bankruptcy law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§
301-03 (2005) (providing for the filing of a "case" under the bankruptcy statute).
5 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip. op. at 4-5.
6 See infra notes 47-53.

7 See Eurofood-E.CJ.,supra note 1, 32-33.
8See infra text accompanying notes 355-62.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 305-36.
10 UNCITRAL
Model
Law
on
Cross-Border
Insolvency,
available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Model Law]. For further discussion of UNCITRAL Model Law, see infra Part VI.A.2.
11See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 66.
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This Article examines the Eurofood-E.C.J. decision and evaluates its
impact on the decisions of the Irish and the Italian courts to open main
insolvency cases for Eurofood. This Article also addresses the broader
international insolvency law issues that the E.C.J. decision left open.
Part II of this Article provides background information on the format
and binding effect of a decision of the E.C.J. Part III explores the
background of Parmalat and Eurofood and describes the Eurofood cases in
the Irish and Italian courts prior to the E.C.J. decision. Part IV examines
the E.C.J. decision, its rationale, and its application to the Irish and Italian
cases.
Part V focuses on the E.C.J. decision's application to procedural
problems in insolvency law of the "equality of arms" principle, which the
E.C.J. had previously imported from the European Court on Human Rights
and had applied principally in the contexts of criminal defense and
administrative law. Part V also explains how the E.C.J. used this concept to
impose E.U. procedural law on the determination of the location of a
debtor's CoMI and the resulting proper national venue for its insolvency
case. Part VI examines the substantive insolvency law issues that the
Eurofood-E.CJ. decision addressed and the procedural issues apart from
those involved in the "equality of arms" analysis. Part VII contains
concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
Before launching on an analysis of the Eurofood-E.CJ.decision, it is
useful to provide some background on the E.U. Regulation and on the
E.C.J. which issued the decision.
A. The E.U. Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings
The principal source of law for international cooperation in E.U.
transnational insolvency proceedings is the E.U. Regulation, 2 which
became effective on May 31, 2002 for all transnational insolvency
proceedings opened on or after that date involving two or more E.U.
countries (other than Denmark, which exercised its right under its E.U.
12 See generally IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY (2002); GABRIEL MOSS ET
AL., THE E.C. REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS AND ANNOTATED GUIDE (2002);
BOB WESSELS, EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (2003) [hereinafter WESSELS, INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS].

13The E.U. Regulation became effective on May 1, 2004 for the ten countries that joined
the European Union on that date.
14 The E.U. Regulation was originally prepared as a stand-alone treaty for the E.U.
Member States. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 12,
31-015 to 31-017 (2002). After
completion of the drafting in 1995, the treaty foundered on the United Kingdom's mad cow
disease problem in 1996: mad cow disease broke out in the cattle herds in the United
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accession treaty to opt out of the E.U. Regulation). Two Annexes, A 5 and
B, 16 specify the national laws of the member countries for "insolvency
proceedings" and "winding up proceedings" that are subject to the E.U.
Convention. Annex C' 7 lists the titles of the liquidators under the laws of
the various E.U. countries that qualify for the E.U. Regulation. The E.U.
Regulation is based on the principle of mutual trust among the E.U.
countries: 18 the E.U. countries trust their sister countries with respect to
both their insolvency laws and their court procedures.' 9
The E.U. Regulation, for the most part, adopts a universalist 20 view: it
intends that a main proceeding encompass all of the debtor's assets on a
world-wide basis and to affect all creditors, wherever located. 2 1 Only one
Kingdom in 1996 and, consequently, the continental E.U. countries imposed a ban on the
importation of U.K. beef. Upset with this course of events, the United Kingdom refused to
sign the E.U. Insolvency Convention. See WESSELS, INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, supra note
12, at 5-6.
15See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, Annex A.
16 See id. Annex B.
17See id. Annex C.
18See id. pmbl. 22; In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., (2006) IESC 41 (Ir.).
19 See Bob Wessels, International Jurisdiction to Open Insolvency Proceedings in
Europe, in ParticularAgainst (Groups ol) Companies 14-15 (2003) [hereinafter Wessels,
Insolvency
Proceedings],
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european union/InternJuris
dictionCompanies.pdf (explaining concept of CoMI under the E.U. Regulation).
20 See WESSELS, INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 7. For a general description
of universalism (including modified territorialism) and territorialism (its opposite), see
Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 105, 108-17 (2005). For a defense of pure universalism, see Liza Perkins,
Note, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-BorderCorporateInsolvencies, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 787 (2000). On modified universalism, see generally Kent Anderson, The
Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the Modified Universal Approach
Considering the Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 679, 687-94 (2000);
Lucian A. Bebchuck & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational
Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775, 778 (1999); Andrew T. Guzman, International
Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179 (2000); Robert K.
Rassmussen, A New Approach to TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-10
(1997); Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for InternationalBankruptcy, 41 AM. J.
COMp. LAW 573, 575-76 (1993); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in
Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 513 (1991); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A
Global Solution to International Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2292-98 (2000); Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and
Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 465 (1991). For a defense of territorialism, see
LYNN M. LoPuCKi, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS ch. 8 (2005), reprintedas Global and Out of Control?, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 79, 89 (2005); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in
InternationalBankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperationin
InternationalBankruptcy: A Post-UniversalistApproach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999);
Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143 (2005).
21 See MOSS ET AL., supra note 12, 3.15; Miguel Virg6s & Etienne Schmit, Report on
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main proceeding may be opened for a particular debtor.22 The universalist

posture of the E.U. Regulation is tempered by the possibility of secondary
proceedings, which must be territorial, in non-CoMI countries.
The E.U. Regulation gives primacy to an insolvency proceeding that is
opened in a debtor's "home country." Only that proceeding may be a main
proceeding, the opening of which is entitled to recognition in other
countries covered by the E.U. Regulation. The home country, for the
purposes of a main insolvency proceeding, is the country where the CoMI
of the entity is located,23 which in turn is the proper location for the main
proceeding.2 A corporation can only have one CoMI for purposes of the
E.U. Regulation. Proceedings in other countries are generally limited to
secondary proceedings. 25 The E.U. Regulation does not attempt to
reconcile the vastly
different insolvency regimes in place in the various
26
E.U. countries.
1. Consequences of Opening a Main Proceeding
The opening of a main proceeding under the E.U. Regulation has
several consequences. 27 First, the proceeding is governed by the laws of the
country where it is opened.28
Second, a judgment opening a main
proceeding receives automatic recognition in all member states with no
the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, reprintedin Moss ET AL., supra note 12, at 263.
The Virg6s & Schmit report was the principal report on the E.U. Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, which was converted into the E.U. Regulation by the substitution of Articles
44-47 (implementing the E.U. Regulation) for Articles 43-46 and 48-55 (providing
formalities for treaty implementation) and an expansion of the preamble. Thus, the Virg6s &
Schmit report is authoritative as to the E.U. Regulation as well. See, e.g., Case C-341/04, In
re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 2 (the Virg6s & Schmit
report "may provide useful guidance when interpreting the regulation.") [hereinafter E.C.J.
A.G. Opinion].
22 See Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21,
15; MOSS ET AL., supra note 12, T 3.15, 8.33;
WESSELS, INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 7.
23 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(1).
See generally Wessels, Insolvency
Proceedings, supra note 19, at 4-10, http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/Europeanunion.html
(explaining the concept of CoMI under the E.U. Regulation). The E.U. Regulation applies
only if the CoMI is located in the European Union. See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, pmbl.
14; MOSS ET AL. supra note 12, 3.09. Thus the E.U. Regulation does not apply to the E.U.
aspects of a cross-border insolvency case if the CoMI is not located in the European Union.
See Moss ET AL. supra note 12, 3.09.
24 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(1).
25 See id. art. 3(2)-(3).
26 See id. pmbl. 12.
27 See generally WESSELS, INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 1-2.
28 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 4; MOSS, supra note 12,
5.33; WESSELS,
supra note 12, at 18-31; lan F. Fletcher, The European Union
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 119,
128-39 (1998); Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21,$ 153.
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS,
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further formalities from the date that it becomes effective in the home
state. 29 Third, the administrator in the main proceeding may exercise his or
her powers in every E.U. country, including repatriating assets, 30 registering
the judgment,3 1 and publishing notice in E.U. countries.32 These effects
may only be challenged in the home court for the main proceeding.33
In addition, a judgment opening a main proceeding in any E.U.
country imposes the forum country's domestic effects of that proceeding
throughout the European Union, 34 except where the E.U. Regulation
provides otherwise as to rights in rem,35 setoff rights,36 or sellers' rights
based on reservation of title.37 For example, an automatic stay or
moratorium under the laws of the forum country
for the main proceeding
38
applies to all creditors in every E.U. country.
Under the E.U. Regulation, a bankruptcy proceeding in a country
where the debtor's CoMI is not located must be a secondary proceeding.
The E.U. Regulation permits the opening of a secondary proceeding in any
country where the debtor has an establishment,4 ° which means "any place of
operations where the debtor carries on a non-transitory economic activity
29 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16; WESSELS, INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, supra
note 12, at 33-35; Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21,
143; Moss ET AL. supra note 12,
8.133.
30 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art.
18(1).
"' See id. art. 22.
32 See id. art. 21.
33See id. art. 17(2).
34See id. art. 4 (the law of the country that opens main proceedings applies unless
otherwise provided in the E.U. Regulation); In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 92 F.3d
1036, 1045-50 (2d Cir. 1996) (standard rules of conflict of laws (or international private
law, as the subject is known outside the United States) apply in many contexts in insolvency
proceedings, and in some instances these rules dictate the application of foreign law in the
forum of the main proceeding); Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21, 90.
35See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 5; Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21,
94-105.
36 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 6.
37See id. art. 7.
38 The consequences may be different under the E.U. Regulation if the country where the
main proceeding is opened lacks an automatic stay. For example, under Dutch law there is
no automatic stay, and a stay is typically issued by the court. For another example, in
Hungary, a stay is issued only if it is approved in the meeting of creditors. See Act XLIX of
1991 on Bankruptcy Proceedings, Liquidation Proceedings and Members' Voluntary
Dissolution § 9 (as amended). Because the exceptions in the E.U. Regulation appear to
apply only to moratoria that arise automatically upon the opening of a proceeding, Article 25
may require that a stay that is not automatic does affect rights in rem, set off rights, and
sellers' rights based on reservation of title.
39See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(2).
40 See id. This provision was deliberately drawn narrowly to limit the opportunities of
creditors to obtain personal or tactical advantages by means of secondary proceedings. See
MOSS ET AL. supra note 12, 8.26.
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with human means and goods. ' 4 1 Because a secondary proceeding can only
be opened in a country where the debtor has an establishment, the E.U.
Regulation prohibits the opening of an insolvency proceeding in a nonCoMI country where the debtor does not conduct non-transitory economic
activity with human means and goods.42
There are two main purposes for secondary proceedings: to assist and
support the main proceeding and to protect local creditors from the main
proceeding. The adoption of the law of the forum country for the main
proceeding, and its exportation throughout the European Union, are
substantially modified if a secondary proceeding is opened in another E.U.
country.43 Under the E.U. Regulation, a secondary proceeding is governed
by the local law of the country where it is opened. 4 While the E.U.
Regulation requires that a secondary proceeding be a liquidation
proceeding,4 5 it also authorizes the administrator in the main proceeding to
obtain a stay of the liquidation for three months at a time, 6 and to propose a
reorganization as authorized by the47insolvency laws of the country where
the secondary proceeding is opened.
2. Center of Main Interests
The jurisdictional challenge under the E.U. Regulation is to determine
where the CoMI is located. The E.U. Regulation answers this question, at
least in part. "In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the
registered office shall be presumed 48 to be the centre of main interests in the
absence of proof to the contrary. ' 49 Recital 13 of the preamble to the E.U.
Regulation amplifies this concept by stating, "The 'centre of main interests'
should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration
41 E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(h). An establishment differs from a subsidiary in

that it is not separately incorporated. Economic activity consisting solely in assets or
investments does not qualify as an "establishment." See Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21, 1
70.
42 See WESSELS, INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 11.

43 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 27-38.
44 See id. art. 28.
41 See id.

46 See id. art. 33.
47 See id. art. 34(1).

48 Unlike U.S. law, under the E.U. Regulation, the presumption that a corporate debtor's
CoMI is located at its place of registration carries some evidentiary weight: it is a factor that
the court may consider, along with the evidence presented, in determining the location of the
debtor's CoMI. See In re ci4net.com Inc., High Court, Ch. Div. (Companies Court), May
20, 2004; [2004] EWHC 1941 (Eng.); Michael Raimon, Centres des Int6rets Principaux et
Coordination des Procddures dans la Jurisprudence Europden sur le R~glement Relatif aux
Procddures d'lnsolvabilit6, 3 J. DROIT INT'L (CLUNET) 739, 750 (2005).
49 E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3(1).

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

27:351 (2007)

of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third
parties. ' 5°
The E.U. Regulation gives critical importance to two factors in
determining the location of the CoMI. First, the CoMI is located at the
place where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a
regular basis, which essentially means the place where it administers its
commercial, industrial, professional, and general economic activities. 5'
Second, this is an objective test based on what is apparent to third parties,
and especially to creditors.5 2 Thus, a creditor's view of where the CoMI is
located is an important factor. Virg6s & .Schmit explain the rationale for
this rule, stating, "Insolvency is a foreseeable risk. It is therefore important
that international jurisdiction be based on a place known to the debtor's
potential creditors. This enables the legal risks which would
have to be
53
assumed in the proceeding of insolvency to be calculated.,
Under both the Model Law and the E.U. Regulation, each company
has a single CoMI and can have only one main proceeding.54
Further, under the E.U. Regulation, the CoMI analysis must be made
separately for each legal entity. 55 Except in a general way, the E.U.
Regulation does not provide for the coordination of the insolvency cases of
related entities. More specifically, it does not authorize the filing or
opening of a main case for a particular company in a specific country
because a parent company or other affiliate has opened a main case in that
country.
B. The European Court of Justice
The E.C.J. is an E.U. court established by the Treaty of Amsterdam,
which is the current version of the constitutive treaty establishing the
European Union.5 6 The E.C.J. is the final authority in the European Union
50Id. pmbl. 13.

In E.U. law, the E.U. Regulation preambles have been treated as

authoritative as the main text of the regulation. See, e.g., Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at
10.
51See Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21,
75. Notably, if a court finds that a
corporation's CoMI is not located at its place of registration, its insolvency case will not be
governed by the law of its country of incorporation. See Raimon, supra note 48, at 750
(discussing cases).
52See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, pmbl. 13.

53See Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21,

75.

54See, e.g., Andr6 J. Berends, The Uncitral Model Law on Cross-BorderInsolvency: A

Comprehensive Overview, 6 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 355 (1998).
55See generally WESSELS, INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 18-20; Virg6s &

Schmit, supra note 21, 76.
56 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaties on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 1, arts. 220-45 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
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for the determination of questions on the interpretation of E.U. law,
including the E.U. Regulation.5 7 In effect, the E.C.J. functions like a
supreme court for E.U. law.
There are three features of the E.C.J. that require comment before I
launch into an examination of the Eurofood cases leading up to the E.C.J.
decision. First, I look at the format of an E.C.J. decision, which differs in
important respects from a typical domestic court decision. Second, I
examine the authority and binding force of an E.C.J. decision. Third, I look
at the distinctive format of an E.C.J. decision resulting from a reference for
preliminary decision by a court of an E.U. country.
1. E.C.J. Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of the E.C.J. with respect to matters arising in courts
of E.U. countries is governed by Article 234 of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
which states in relevant part:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning:
the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment,
request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no
judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring
the matter before the Court of Justice.5 8
Under this provision, referral of an issue of interpretation of an E.U.
regulation by the highest court of a country is mandatory and by a lower
court is discretionary.
The E.C.J. has jurisdiction to review issues under the E.U. Convention
only upon reference of a national court, 59 and then only if the court
considers that a decision of the E.C.J. is necessary for the national court to
give judgment in a matter pending before it.60 A decision of the E.C.J. is
57 See MOSS ET AL., supra note 12,

2.29.

58Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 56, art. 234.
59 See id. art. 68; MOSS ET AL., supra note 12, 2.32.
60 In this circumstance, it is mandatory for the national court of last resort to make a

reference to the E.C.J. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 56, art. 68.
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binding on the national court that has requested its opinion, and the national
court is obligated to conform to an E.C.J. decision.
However, the E.C.J.
does not have the power to overrule or set aside a national court decision.
An E.C.J. decision interpreting E.U. law goes back to the national
court, for application to the facts of the particular case by that court.
However, the national judge typically has little discretion and flexibility in
making the final decision.62 Nonetheless, the ultimate judgment comes
from a national court, with the full force thereof, and not from an E.U.
court. Thus, the E.C.J. is integrated with the national courts into a unitary
judicial system.63
This feature of an E.C.J. decision, like that in Eurofood, arises from
the nature of the reference to the E.C.J. Unlike a plenary appeal, the
reference to the E.C.J. consists only of specific questions that arise under
E.U. law. These questions generally are phrased in the abstract, as in the
Eurofood case, and do not ask for the concrete application of an E.U.
principle to the facts of a particular case.
There is a distinctive value in this procedure. The ultimate decision is
issued by the national supreme court and not by an E.U. court. It thus has
the value, prestige, and enforceable character of a national court decision,
rather than the less certain status of an E.U. decision with less apparatus to
enforce it.
2. BindingForce of an E.C.J. Decision
A decision of the E.C.J. is binding in the courts of the E.U. member
countries. Article 244 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 64 provides that "[t]he
judgments of the [E.C.J.] shall be enforceable under the conditions laid
down in Article 256.",65 In turn, Article 256 provides in relevant part:
Enforcement shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in
force in the State in the territory of which it is carried out. The order
for its enforcement shall be appended to the decision, without other
formality than verification of the authenticity of the decision ....
When these formalities have been completed on application by the
party concerned, the latter may proceed to enforcement in
accordance with the national law,
by bringing the matter directly
66
before the competent authority.

61 See

id.

62 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2421 (1991).
63 See id.

at 2420.

64Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 56, art. 3.
65

Id.

66 Id.

art. 256.
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Thus, while the formalities are different, the E.C.J.'s Eurofood
decision essentially has the same force as a decision of a supreme court or a
court of last resort. The Italian courts will be required to change their
Eurofood decisions to conform to the E.C.J. ruling.
3. Formatof an E.C.J. Decision
An E.C.J. decision resulting from a referral from a court 67 of an E.U.
country looks different from a decision of a national (or lower level) court
in one substantial respect relevant to this Article. To a lawyer or judge
accustomed to reading judicial decisions, whether from common law or
civil law countries, such an E.C.J. decision is remarkably abstract. The
analysis portion of the decision is mostly limited to a discussion of the
applicable principles at issue. There is rather little discussion of how the
principles apply in the particular case giving rise to the referral to the E.C.J.
This feature of such an E.C.J. decision arises from the procedural
context of the case. The case belongs to the referring national court, and
not to the E.C.J. The E.C.J. does not decide the particular case and does not
declare a winner and a loser. The E.C.J.'s jurisdiction is limited to the
questions referred to it, which are typically framed as legal questions.
As the court before which the case is pending, the referring court has
the responsibility of applying the legal principles to the facts of that case.
This procedure supports the policy grounds for the structure that the
national court (which may be a lower court in the country) issues the
decision, so that it carries the weight of a domestic court decision.
III. THE EUROFOOD INSOLVENCY CASES IN IRELAND AND
ITALY
68

Parmalat is one of the largest business failures in European history.
Although it began as a small, family-owned milk distribution company, the
business grew into an international dairy conglomerate operating in more
than thirty countries, with more than 30,000 employees and gross annual
Its principal subsidiary, Parmalat
receipts exceeding C7.5 billion.6 9
67

The E.C.J., as a court of first instance, also considers cases that involve actions by

private persons (including corporations and other business entities) against the European
Union.

68 See Jonathan Stempel, Update 2-CitigroupLoses Bid to Dismiss ParmalatSuit in NJ,

July 14, 2006, https://secure.reuters.com/news/articlebusiness.aspx?type=banking
Financial&storylD=nN 14216273&WTmodLoc=BizArt-RI -IndustryNews-2&from=business
(last visited Jan. 10, 2007). The only larger business failure in European history is Yukos
Oil Co., which collapsed at the end of 2004. See In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2005).
69 See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 3-4. For a more detailed description of
Parmalat's history, corporate structure and business, see Annika Wolf, Success and Failure
REUTERS,
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Finanziaria SpA, was listed on the Italian stock exchange.
A. Parmalat's Collapse
The Parmalat corporate group collapsed in deep financial crisis in late
2003,70 with charges of massive financial fraud and the arrest in Italy of
several of its principal managers, including the two Italian directors of
Eurofood. 71 Regulatory, legal, and criminal charges remain pending in
various countries, including Italy and the United States. 72 The fallout of the
Parmalat SpA 73 insolvency filing in Parma, Italy in late 2003 led to the
filing of insolvency proceedings for Eurofood, its Irish subsidiary, in both
Ireland and Italy, and to the international venue problems created by these
and other related filings.
The background events leading to the filing of the involuntary
bankruptcy petition against Eurofood in Dublin played out over a period of
approximately eight weeks beginning on December 4, 2003, when the
Parmalat Group defaulted on a large debenture due on that date because of
an insuperable liquidity crisis.74 Parmalat's announcement of this default
on December 8 led to an international financial crisis for Parmalat's
corporate empire.75
The Italian government responded on December 23 by issuing decreelaw No. 347,76 amending its law providing for extraordinary administration
of companies.7 7 The new law permits a very rapid decision on the opening

in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings-Parmalat-A European and American
Perspective 28-33 (2006), http://www.iiiglobal.org/prize/2006/060707wolf.PDF.
70 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip op. at 4.
71See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 3-4.
72 See id. at 4.

73 SpA is the Italian abbreviation for societ6 per actione, the typical corporate form for a
large Italian corporation.
74 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip op. at 4.
75It first appeared that approximately E4 billion were unaccounted for in the Parmalat
empire. Samuel L. Bufford, InternationalInsolvency Case Venue in the European Union:
The Parrnalatand Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 429, 439 (2006), available
at http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european union/060710Bufford.pdf. It turned out that
the financial problems were more serious than was thought at that time. It is now reported
that Parmalat has approximately €20 billion in creditor claims, and expects to have assets of
E3.7 billion to E5 billion (of which E2 billion is expected in recoveries from litigation) from
which to pay these claims. See Fresh Milk: Parmalatto Trade Again, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29,
2005, at Cl.
76 See Decreto-Legge 23 dicembre 2003, n. 347, Gazz. Uff. Dec. 24, 2003, n. 298,
modified by Legge 18 febbraio 2004, n. 39, Gazz. Uff. Feb. 20, 2004, n. 42, modified further
by Legge 5 luglio 2004, n. 166, Gazz. Uff. July 6, 2004, n. 156, modified further by Legge
28 gennaio 2005, n. 6, Gazz. Uff. Jan. 28, 2005 [hereinafter Law 347/2003].
77 See Legislative Decree No. 270, July 8, 1999. Under the new law, a business must
either be reorganized pursuant to a plan within two years or sold in the first year. If neither
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of an insolvency proceeding for a very large debtor. As originally adopted,
the revised procedure was available only to a debtor with at least a thousand
employees and debts of at least El billion.7 8 Only Parmalat and four or five
other Italian companies (notably, including Fiat) met the size requirements
for extraordinary administration. More recently, to accommodate the case
for Volare Airlines SpA,79 the requirements to qualify have been lowered to
500 employees and a total debt of E300 million. 80 Under the new
procedure, adopted just before Christmas 2004, a company seeking
extraordinary administration must apply first to the Minister of Productive
Activities for admission into extraordinary administration. 8' Afterwards, a
court must issue an order opening the insolvency proceeding upon a finding
that the company is insolvent. 82
Pursuant to the new law enacted on the previous day, on Christmas
Eve 2003, Parmalat SpA filed its request for extraordinary administration
with the Minister of Productive Activities. 83 The minister immediately
granted the request, and appointed Dr. Enrico Bondi as extraordinary
administrator. 84 On December 27, the Parma court confirmed that Parmalat85
SpA was insolvent and opened an extraordinary administration case for it.
Five other Parmalat entities filed extraordinary administration cases in
Parma in the intervening month, following the same procedure, and thirteen
more filed by the time that Eurofood filed its own case in Parma on
February 9, 2004.86
Because the Parmalat corporate group was doing business in some
thirty countries, its collapse spawned insolvency proceedings in a number
of those countries. In this Article, I deal principally with the Irish and
Italian insolvency proceedings for a single subsidiary, Eurofood IFSC Ltd.

goal is reached, the business must be liquidated. See Luciano Panzani, Conflict of
Jurisdiction in European Cross Border Insolvency Law: The Eurofood Case (2006) (on file
with author). Justice Panzani is a member of the Italian Supreme Court, and is the Judicial
Member of the Italian commission that is drafting revisions to the Italian insolvency law.
78 See Law 347/2003, supra note 76, art. 1.
79 See Lucio Ghia, The Reform of the ItalianBankruptcy Law and the UncitralInsolvency
Guide Law 8 (2005), http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/italy/06053I ghia.pdf.
80 See Legge 28 gennaio 2005, n. 6, modifying Law 347/2003, supra note 76, art. 1.
81See Law 347/2003, supra note 76, art. 2.
82 See id. art. 4.
83See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 4.
84 See id.
85See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip. op. at 5. The proper Italian venue for a
corporate insolvency case is the court where the corporation is registered. Pursuant to
typical European procedure, corporations in Italy are registered with their local court.
86 See Parmalat Concordato Creditori, Avviso ai Creditori del Gruppo Parmalat,
http://cp22.etdotcom.it/it (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
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B. The Eurofood Subsidiary
Eurofood was registered in Ireland on November 5, 1997 as a
company "limited by shares," with its registered office in Dublin, Ireland.87
It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Parmalat SpA. Eurofood's principal
purpose was to obtain financing for Parmalat's Venezuelan and Brazilian
subsidiaries under the favorable tax treatment for businesses located in the
Dublin port.
Eurofood's headquarters were located in the International Finance
Services Centre (hence the "IFSC" in Eurofood's name), an urban renewal
center located at the Custom House Dock in Dublin. The center is
dedicated to businesses providing internationally traded financial services
to non-residents of Ireland.8 8 Each business at that location enjoys tax
haven benefits not available to other businesses in Ireland and is subject to 89a
number of conditions including certification by the Minister of Finance.
Eurofood's certificate required it to operate at that location and limited its
90
operating authority to providing financing facilities to the Parmalat Group.
Because of its location and favored tax status, Eurofood was required to
obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance to move its location or to
make any change in management (including a change in its directors).9' It
was also subject to regulation by the Irish revenue authorities and the
Central Bank of Ireland.
Eurofood had no employees of its own. Its day-to-day administration
was conducted by Bank of America in Ireland pursuant to an administration
agreement governed by Irish law. 92 In addition, the agreement contained an
Irish jurisdiction clause.9 3 Eurofood was subject to Irish accounting
94
requirements, and its books and records were maintained in Dublin.
Eurofood had engaged in only three financing transactions during its
history. The first two occurred in 1998. Eurofood issued notes for a private
placement of $80 million to provide collateral for a loan by Bank of
America to finance Parmalat operations in Venezuela. 95 On the same date,
Eurofood borrowed an additional $100 million from a lending consortium
headed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. to finance Parmalat business

87 For a summary of the Eurofood background, see Craig Martin, EurofoodFight: Forum

Shopping Under The E. U. Regs, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2005, at 36.
88See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 2.
9 See id.

90 See id.

91 See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 2.
92 See Eurofood-Ireland,supranote 1, at 2.
9' See id.
94 See id. at 3.
95 See id.
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operations in Brazil. 96 Finally, in 2001, Eurofood engaged in a swap
transaction with Bank of America for $2 million to finance its operations in
Ireland.97 Eurofood's only substantial assets were the obligations owed to it
on the two large loans, and a guarantee of its debts given by the Parmalat
parent corporation, whose ability to deliver on these guarantees was in deep
question in early 2004.98

Until November 12, 2003, Eurofood had four directors, two Irish and
two Italian. All but one of its fifteen board of directors meetings were
conducted in Dublin; the remaining meeting was conducted by a conference
call. 99 On November 12, 2003 one of the Italian directors resigned, and the
other resigned on January 20, 2004. Both were in Italian custody when the
Eurofood winding up petition was filed in Dublin on January 27, 2004.100
C. The Irish Eurofood Proceeding in Dublin
Bank of America filed an involuntary winding up case for Eurofood
under Irish law in the Dublin High Court' 0 ' on January 27, 2004, and
requested the appointment of a temporary administrator. 0 2 On the date of
filing, Eurofood was hopelessly insolvent' 03 because of the serious doubt
that Parmalat could honor its guaranty of the Eurofood debt. Bank of
America filed the case in part because Eurofood had informed it that
Parmalat might attempt to move its CoMI out of Ireland.' 0 4
On the same day, the Dublin High Court appointed Pearse Farrell as
provisional liquidator for Eurofood. 0 5 Because the Dublin case for
Eurofood was an involuntary case, the Dublin court issued no order on that
date to open a winding up of Eurofood. The court also made no
determination on the issue of whether the case was a "main proceeding"
96

See id.

9' See id.
98

See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 3.

9 See id. at 2-3.

1oo See id. Eventually both directors (along with nine other Parmalat officials) arranged
plea bargains in Italian court and received suspended prison sentences. See Eric Sylvers,
Eleven Convicts in ParmalatFraud, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 29, 2005, available at

http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/28/business/parma.php.
10' Under the E.U. Regulation, a winding up under Irish law is one of the kinds of
insolvency proceedings that invokes the provisions of the Regulation. See E.U. Regulation,
supra note 3, art. 2(a), app. A.
102 See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 5.
103 See id. at 3.
104 See id. at 4-5. Whether a court has jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings for a

debtor that moves its CoMI after the filing of a request to open a case, but before the court
has acted on the request, is before the E.C.J. See Case C-1/04, In re Susanne StaubitzSchreiber, 2004 O.J. (C 71) 10.
105 See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip. op. at 4-5.
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within the meaning of the E.U. Regulation, or where Eurofood's CoMI was
located. The court set a further hearing on February 23, 2004
to take up
06
these issues after notice to the appropriate parties in interest. 1
D. The Eurofood Proceeding in Parma
Under Law 347/2003, the Administrator of a company in extraordinary
administration may request the opening of a similar extraordinary
administration in case in the same court for any other company in the
corporate group. Thus, pursuant to the then-new revisions to the Italian
insolvency laws, the commencement of insolvency proceedings in Italy for
Eurofood was a two-step procedure involving an application to the Minister
of Productive Activities, followed by a filing with a local Italian court.
1. Procedure

On January 29, 2004, two days after the Dublin filing for Eurofood,
Mr. Farrell gave notice of the insolvency filing and of his appointment to
Dr. Bondi, 107 who immediately took action in Italy. A week later, on
February 5, Dr. Bondi presented an application to Italy's Minister of
Productive Activities for Eurofood's admission into extraordinary
administration under Italian law and for his appointment as administrator. 68
Although informed of the pending Irish proceeding for Eurofood, the
Minister granted the application on February 9.
On the next day, February 10, Dr. Bondi filed a proceeding in Parma
for Eurofood 10 9 as a companion to the nineteen other proceedings for
Parmalat-related entities then pending. The court in Parma immediately set
a hearing for Tuesday, February 17 on the opening of the Eurofood
proceeding and, in particular, to determine whether Eurofood was
insolvent." ° The court further ordered Dr. Bondi to give notice of the
106 Irish statute grants power to the court to make this determination. See Companies
Act, 1963 (Act No. 33/1963) (Ir.) § 216, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/
1963 33.html (providing for a hearing).
17 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip op. at 5.
108See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 1, slip op. at 8. Eurofood did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements for extraordinary administration under Italian law of a thousand
employees and annual revenues of a hundred billion euros. However, under Italian law
(which is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2005)), once a qualifying corporation is admitted to
extraordinary administration, any related business entity in the corporate enterprise is
permitted to file in the same court. See Law 347/2003, supra note 76, art. 3 (as amended);
Eurofood-Italy,supra note 1, slip op. at 15.
109See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 8.
110Under the law for extraordinary administration, the court was given only five days in
which to make a decision on the opening of an extraordinary administration proceeding. See
Law 347/2003 (as amended), supra note 76, § 4; Panzani, supra note 77, at 4. The law
subsequently was amended to give the court fifteen days in which to make this decision. See
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hearing to "interested parties.'
On February 12, Dr. Bondi filed a report
with the Parma court on Eurofood,1 2 but he did not provide a copy to Mr.
Farrell." 3
Also on February 10, Dr. Bondi removed one of Eurofood's two Irish
114
directors (a lawyer in Dublin), and appointed three new Italian directors.
Even though Eurofood's Irish license to operate required approval from the
Irish Department of Finance for any change in directors, Dr. Bondi did not
seek such approval. Apparently, the new board took no action relevant to
the opening of main proceedings for Eurofood in either Ireland or Italy.
On February 16, 2004, Mr. Farrell filed a motion in the Dublin court
requesting permission to participate in the Parma hearing and for an earlier
hearing on the Irish winding up petition. The court granted
him permission
5
to travel to Italy but refused to advance its own hearing."
2. Decision of the Parma Court
On February 20, 2004, the Parma court issued its ruling opening an
extraordinary administration proceeding for Eurofood on the grounds that it
was clearly insolvent. 6
In order to open a proceeding for extraordinary administration, the
Parma court had to find that it had jurisdiction, which Mr. Farrell disputed.
The Parma court found Italian jurisdiction, based on Italian law permitting
the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if its administrative
headquarters or principal purposes are located in Italy.' '7 The court found
that the activity of Eurofood management and the "propelling center of the
enterprise" was located in Parma.' 18 The court based this decision on a

Legge 5 iuglio 2004, n. 166, Gazz. Uff. July 6, 2004, n. 156, modifying Law 347/2003, supra
note 76.
111See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 1,slip op. at 9 (quoting from Mar. 1, 2004 affidavit
filed by Francesco Gianni (on behalf of Dr. Bondi)).
112See Eurofood-Italy,supra note 1, slip op. at 5; Martin, supra note 87, at 36.
113 See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1,at 15 (opinion by Justice Fennelly); E.C.J. A.G.

Opinion, supra note 21, 39.
114It is not known whether the new directors met or whether the new board of directors
approved the extraordinary administration filing for Eurofood. While any such approval
would have to have been after the fact, the Italian law (like typical U.S. corporate laws) may
authorize retroactive board approval of corporate actions. This issue was not discussed in
the Eurofood judicial decision.
115 See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 10.
116See Eurofood-Parma,supra note 1, slip op. at 10-11. It is difficult to determine
precisely what the Parma court decided. It never clearly states its conclusions on the
important issues. Its decision is very poorly written, and the sentences are very long and
convoluted. The main analysis consists of three sentences that take up nearly two full pages.
"' See id.at2.

118
Id.
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distinction between "executive administrators," who were the two Italian
directors, and "non-executive administrators," who were the Irish
directors." 9 Based on Dr. Bondi's evidence, which likely was very
different from that presented to the Dublin court, the Parma court found, in
fact, that the real management of Eurofood was conducted in Parma.' 20 In
addition, the court found that the economic purpose of Eurofood was
entirely tied to the Parmalat corporate group based in Parma.12 1 The court
found that creditors of Eurofood should not be surprised with an Italian
court taking jurisdiction over its insolvency proceeding, because Eurofood
was essentially an "empty box"; its only asset was the corporate guarantee
of its Italian parent
Parmalat SpA,122 whose "mother proceeding" was
23
Italy.
in
located
The Parma court found unpersuasive Mr. Farrell's argument that
Eurofood was incorporated in Ireland and that it was managed there
pursuant to a management agreement with Bank of America. The court
found this to be only a "logistical agreement" and opined that the court
should look at the substance of the administration, not its form. 24 In
contrast, the court found that Eurofood was:
[S]imply a conduit for the financial policy of Parmalat S.p.A....

with the exclusive aim of facilitating flows of money with the group
with a view to an undisputed tax advantage ...but as its exclusive
point of reference the interests of the parent
25 company of which it can
be considered purely a financial division.
The court found that the controlling authority for the enterprise was located
in Italy. 126 Thus, the Parma court effectively found that Eurofood's CoMI
was located in Italy and that it could open a main proceeding for Eurofood.
The court in Parma further found that the proceeding in Dublin had not
progressed to the point where the E.U. Regulation would prevent the
opening of a main proceeding for Eurofood in Italy. In the court's view, the

119 See id. at 3-4. The court gave no legal basis for making such a distinction. There is
no support for such a distinction in Irish law, under which Eurofood was incorporated.
120 See id. at 4.
121 See id. at 5. A consideration of the relations between Eurofood and the other Parmalat

entities is not legitimate under the E.U. Regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 20910; see also Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21, 76. See also infra text accompanying notes
357-67 (recommending that the E.U. Regulation be amended to accommodate the joint
needs of corporate groups in the insolvency context).
122 See Eurofood-Parma,supra note 1, slip op. at 5-6.
123 See id. at 10.
124 See id. at 7.

125See id. at 8.
126 See id. at 7-8.
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mere filing of the Irish proceeding and the appointment of a provisional
liquidator did not constitute an "opening" of the proceeding, as defined in
E.U. Regulation Article 3(3), 127 that required recognition under E.U.
Regulation Article 16.128
E. Subsequent Irish Proceedings
Notwithstanding the decisions of the court in Parma respecting
Eurofood, the Irish courts continued with their Eurofood insolvency
proceedings.
1. The Dublin High Court Decision

After the Parma decision on February 20, 2004, the Dublin High Court
heard the application for opening a main proceeding for Eurofood on March
2-4, 2004 and handed down its decision to open the proceeding on March
23, 2004. This opinion seethed with disapproval of the procedures followed
in the Parma court.
The Dublin High Court held that Eurofood's CoMI was located in
Ireland and that the Irish proceeding was the main proceeding for Eurofood.
Two elements are required, the court held, to give rise to the opening of
main proceedings in an insolvency proceeding in Ireland: first, the CoMI
must be located in Ireland, and
29 second, the insolvency proceedings must
actually be opened in Ireland.1

127

E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 3 provides in relevant part:

1. The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a
debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency
proceedings. In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered
office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
2. Where the centre of a debtor's main interests is situated within the territory of a
Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to open
insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if he possesses an establishment
within the territory of the other Member State.
The effects of those proceedings shall be restricted to the assets of the debtor
situated in the territory of the latter Member State.
3. Where insolvency proceedings have been opened under paragraph 1, any
proceedings opened subsequently under paragraph 2 shall be secondary
proceedings.
128

See id. at 9.

129

See Eurofood-Parma,supra note 1, slip op. at 21.
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a. Time of Opening of Proceeding in Dublin
Taking the second point first, the court found that an insolvency
proceeding, as defined in the E.U. Regulation, was opened in Ireland on
January 27, 2004. The court based its conclusion on two grounds. First, it
found that the appointment of a provisional liquidator on that date was a
"judgment" within the meaning
of the E.U. Regulation's provision13 ° on
31
opening a main proceeding.1
Second, the court found that its March 23 decision to open a main
proceeding for Eurofood related back to the January 27 date and thus
required recognition by the Parma court pursuant to Article 16.1.132 Article
16.1 of the E.U. Regulation requires the courts of any other E.U. country to
recognize a judgment, from a court with jurisdiction, that opens a main
proceeding "from the time that it becomes effective in the State of the
opening of proceedings." 133 By virtue of the relation-back rule in the Irish
Companies Act, 134 even the March 23 decision took effect as of January 27,
according to the Dublin court. 135 Thus, in the court's view, its January
27
36
decision predated the February 20 decision of the court in Parma.'
As to the location of Eurofood's CoMI, Dr. Bondi argued that the Irish
court failed to make any finding on this subject in its January 27 hearing.
The Dublin court found that it was not necessary to make an express
37
declaration on this subject if, in fact, the CoMI was located in Ireland.
The court found that this determination was 3implicit
in its determination to
8
appoint a provisional liquidator on that date.1

130 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(e).
131Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 1, slip op. at 21-22; accord Virg6s & Schmit, supra

note 21, at art. 2(f), 147 ("It is sufficient for [a judgment] to have effect in the State of
opening and for its effects not to have been stayed.").
132 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16(1).
133Id.

134See Companies Act, 1963 § 220.2 (Act No. 33/1963) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1963_33.html.
135 This relation-back rule, the court noted, mirrored a similar provision in the law of
England and Wales. See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 22.
136 The A.G. opinion filed in the Eurofood-E.C.J. case articulates a third ground for
finding that the Dublin case was opened on January 27, 2004. The opinion points out that
Section 220 of the Irish Companies Act of 1963 provides that the winding up of a company
is deemed to commence at the time of presentation of a petition for winding up (absent a
prior resolution passed by the company). See E.C.J. A.G. Opinion, supranote 21,
22, 93.
137 See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op. at 23.
138 This reasoning is quite questionable. Under the E.U. Regulation, a secondary
proceeding may be opened before a main proceeding. See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3,
art. 3.4. A liquidator is clearly needed in a secondary proceeding, because it must be a
liquidation. See id. art. 3.3. Thus, the appointment of a liquidator is ambiguous as to
whether the proceeding is a main or a secondary proceeding.
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b. Location of CoMI in Ireland
The Dublin court began its discussion of Eurofood's CoMI by
observing that it enjoyed the presumption that it was located in Ireland
1 39
because Eurofood's registered office was in Ireland at all relevant times.
The CoMI
normally corresponds to the location of the debtor's head
140
office.

In looking beyond this presumption, the Dublin court held that the
CoMI should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the
administration of its interests on a regular basis; therefore, third parties,
especially potential creditors, can ascertain the location of the CoMI.141 All
of the evidence before the Dublin court indicated that the actual creditors
considered Eurofood to have its CoMI in Ireland. The existing creditors of
Eurofood, according to their evidence, clearly believed they were dealing
with investments issued by a company located in Ireland that was subject to
Irish fiscal and regulatory provisions. 42 Thus, the Dublin
43 court suggested,
the Parma court had ignored the creditors' perceptions. 1
Given its finding that it was the first to open a main proceeding for
Eurofood, the Dublin court found that the court in Parma
lacked jurisdiction
44
to open a main proceeding for the same company.
c. Public Policy
The Dublin court also found that the public policy exception in Article
26 applied in its Eurofood proceeding. In particular, the European
Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") includes the right to a fair
hearing, 45 which the Parma court violated in failing to give the creditors an
opportunity to be heard and failing to give either the creditors or the Irish
provisional
liquidator sufficient notice of the hearing in order to prepare a
46
defense. 1
F. The Irish Supreme Court Decision
Dr. Bondi appealed the Eurofood-Dublin decision to the Irish Supreme
Court. The Court issued a two-part opinion on July 27, 2004.14' The Court
139 See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip. op. at 23.
141 See id. at 25 (citing Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 21).
141See id. at 23-24.
142See

143

id. at 27.
See id.

'44 See id. at 29.

See European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(1955), available at http://www.echr/Basic Texts/english/pdf [hereinafter ECHR].
146 See Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, at 30-32.
145

141See id. at

2.
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considered three main issues: first, whether insolvency proceedings had
been opened first in Ireland or in Italy; second, whether Eurofood's CoMI
was located in Ireland or in Italy; and third, whether there was such an
absence of fair procedures
in the Parma court that its decision should not be
48
recognized in Ireland. 1
The Court found general agreement that it would be required to refer
certain questions relating to these issues to the E.C.J. 149 To assist the E.C.J.
in deciding these issues, the 5Irish
Supreme Court made rulings on relevant
0
facts and issues of Irish law.'
1. FactualDeterminations
The Irish Supreme Court found that the only disputed issue of fact was
the extent to which the Eurofood board of directors meetings were held in
Dublin. While Dr. Bondi disputed whether many of the meetings were held
in Dublin, the Court found that "the evidence [is] overwhelming that the[se]
meetings were properly and regularly held in Dublin," and
51 that Dr. Bondi
had provided no other evidence to support his contention. 1
In addition, Dr. Bondi contended that the two Italian directors were
"executive" directors, while the two Irish directors were "non-executive"
15
directors.
The Court
found
basis for 1this
53 distinction, either in law or
in the corporation's
Articles
of no
Association.
2. Opening of Main Insolvency Proceedings
The first issue addressed by the Irish Supreme Court was at what time,
under the Irish procedure utilized in the Eurofood proceeding, the winding
up proceeding was "opened" under Irish law for the purposes of the E.U.
Regulation. In the Irish Supreme Court's view, there are two ways that the
Irish winding up petition can take priority over the Italian petition. First,
the decision appointing a provisional liquidator may constitute a "judgment
opening insolvency proceedings" for the purposes of Article 16.114
Alternatively, the Dublin court's later decision to order a winding up may
relate back to the date of presentation of the petition.1 55 In either case, the
148See id. at 5.
149 See id. at 6.
150 See id. at 7.

15'See id. at 7-8.
152The Parma court in the Eurofood-Parma proceeding had found that the Italian
directors were "executive directors" and that the Irish directors were "non-executive
directors." See Eurofood-Parma,supra note 1, slip op. at 3-4; see also supra notes 113-21

and accompanying text.
153 See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 8.
154 See id.
at 9-10.
155 See id.
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Irish Supreme Court found that the applicable date was January 27, 2004,
which was before an insolvency case for Eurofood was presented to the
Parma court. Thus, the Italian court would be required to recognize the
prior Irish court decision to open a main proceeding for Eurofood.
The Irish Supreme Court found that, under Irish law, the legal effects
of a winding up proceeding (which is a proceeding subject to the E.U.
Regulation)' 56 are "deemed to commence at the time of the presentation of
the petition for the winding up.' 57 While recognizing that a winding up
may not be ordered even though a petition has been filed or a provisional
liquidator has been appointed, the Court found that a proceeding is deemed
to have been opened on the date of the presentation of 58
the petition, provided
that the court subsequently issues a winding up order.'
The Irish Supreme Court found the E.U. Regulation less than clear on
the issue of when an insolvency proceeding is opened, entitling the
proceeding to community-wide recognition.
Article 16 of the E.U.
Regulation provides for the recognition of a "judgment opening insolvency
proceedings. 16 ° The Irish Supreme Court found some ambiguity in the
meaning of this phrase, because it does not exactly match the definitions in
Article 2.161 Article 2(e) provides that a "judgment" with respect to the
opening of insolvency proceedings or the appointment of a liquidator "shall
include the decision of any court empowered to open such proceedings or to
appoint a liquidator."' 162 While an Irish provisional liquidator clearly
qualifies as a liquidator under this provision, Article 2(e) does not refer to a
"judgment appointing a liquidator."' 63 Therefore, the question in the
Court's view was whether an order appointing a provisional liquidator
constituted a judgment opening the proceeding that was subject to
recognition under Article 16.16
The court 65found that it required a
preliminary ruling from the E.C.J. on this issue.'

156See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, Annex A.
157 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting the Companies Act 1963 §
220(2)).
158 See id. at 10.
159See id.
160E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16.1.
161See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 19-20.

162E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(e).
163Id.

164 See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 9-10.
165See id. at 10.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

27:351 (2007)

3. Center of Main Interests
In contrast, the Irish Supreme Court found the evidence overwhelming
that Eurofood's CoMI was located in Ireland at all relevant times. 166 While
this issue is governed by E.U. law, the Court found that it is predominantly
an issue of fact (on which the trial court's decision is entitled167to greater
deference) and that the facts before the Dublin court were clear.
The Court pointed to the applicable E.U. Regulation provision, Article
3.1, which states:
The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the
centre of a debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction
to open insolvency proceedings. In the case of a company or legal
person, the place of the registered offices shall be presumed to be the
68
centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary.'
Further, the Court noted that Recital 13 states, "[t]he 'centre of main
interests' should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the
administration of his or her interests
on a regular basis and is therefore
69
ascertainable by third parties."1
The Court found two elements relevant in Recital 13. First, as to the
place of the administration of its interests on a regular basis, the court found
the evidence overwhelming that all of Eurofood's administration of its
interests took place in Ireland. 7 0 Indeed, Dr. Bondi did not contest that
Eurofood conducted the administration of its interests in Ireland, except
with respect to some of the meetings of171its board of directors, and the Court
found this evidence to be insubstantial.
The E.C.J. found that the second relevant element in Recital 13 is that
172
the CoMI should be ascertainable by third parties, especially creditors.
The creditors in this proceeding presented detailed evidence of the lengths
to which73 they went to satisfy themselves that Eurofood's CoMI was in
Ireland. 1
The Irish Supreme Court was very troubled by Dr. Bondi's response to
these issues. Bondi relied on five arguments: 174 (1) Eurofood was a wholly

166 See id. at 10- 1l.
167 See

id.
Regulation, supra note 3, art 3.1.
169 Id. Recital 13.
170 See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 21.
168 E.U.

171 See id. at

22.

172 See id.

173See id. at 11.
174

See id.
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owned subsidiary of Parmalat; 175 (2) its sole purpose was to provide
financing for companies in the Parmalat Group;' 7 (3) company policy was
decided at Parmalat headquarters in Italy by Parmalat executives, and
Eurofood exercised no independent decision-making; 177 (4) Eurofood had
178
no employees in Ireland;79
and (5) Eurofood's liability to its creditors was
guaranteed by Parmalat.1
The Court found these arguments troubling because they were "deeply
inimical to the need for respect for separate corporate identity and respect
for the rules of law (including Community law rules) relating to companies
80
that the separate existence of such companies should be ignored."'
Essentially, Dr. Bondi's argument was that Eurofood was operated as an
agency of Parmalat and did not have a functionally separate existence. If
the test were ultimate financial control, rather than legal and corporate
existence, the Court stated, this would have "very serious implications for

the future of international corporate structures ....

,181

4. Recognition of the ParmaDecision Opening a Main Proceedingfor
Eurofood
In a separate opinion, the Irish Supreme Court decided that recognition
of the decision of the Italian court would be contrary to Irish public
policy.182 The relevant principle of Irish law, the Court found, is the
principle requiring fair procedures in all judicial and administrative
proceedings, which has both common law and constitutional foundations.' 83
This fairness requirement includes a right to reasonable notice of the nature
of the decision at issue and the evidence on which it is sought. 84 If an Irish
court would find the procedures inadequate for an Irish judicial or
administrative body, the Court held, the decision of a foreign court
suffering from
the same procedural irregularities should not be
85
recognized.
The Irish Supreme Court was particularly disturbed by the fact that Dr.
Bondi made no effort to contest any of the facts found by the Dublin High

See id.
176 See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 11.
177 See id.
175

178
179

See id. In fact, Eurofood had no employees at all.
See id.

180 See id. at 23.

18'See id.
182 See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 13-20.
183 See id. at 35.
184 See id. at 36.

185 See id.
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Court on the due process violations in the Parma court proceeding.1 86 It
was uncontested that Dr. Bondi failed to serve the Irish provisional
administrator with copies of the Parma petition or other papers, despite
several verbal and written requests for them. The administrator complained
that he was significantly hindered in making his presentation to the Parma
court for lack of these documents. Further, with full knowledge of these
complaints, Dr. Bondi's counsel appeared in the Irish Supreme Court with
no explanation for this conduct. 187 "It is not possible," the Court responded,
"to refrain from criticising the behaviour of the Appellant in the strongest
terms.", 188
Even recognizing the need for urgent action in a large insolvency
proceeding, the Irish Supreme Court found that if Dr. Bondi had failed to
provide copies of his documents in the same manner in an Irish court, the
resulting decision, taken without providing fair procedures, would be so
manifestly89contrary to public policy in Ireland that it would be void under
Irish law.'
The Irish Supreme Court recognized, however, that Irish public policy
is not decisive on its obligation to recognize the decision of the Italian
court. The Treaty of Amsterdam mandates that a court of final appeal refer
any issue of E.C. law interpretation to the E.C.J. for preliminary decision.
Thus, the Court decided, it must defer to the E.C.J. for a ruling on the
application of the E.U. Regulation to this issue.' 90
G. Reference to the European Court of Justice
Based on the analyses described above, the Irish Supreme Court
proceeding
not decide the appeal in the
determined that it could
192 Eurofood
91
without first referring' five questions to the E.C.J.
The first question was whether the January 27, 2004 proceedings in the
Dublin court constituted a judgment opening an insolvency proceeding

186 See id. at

37.

181See id. (Dr. Bondi's counsel stated in oral argument that "he had no instructions on
the matter.").
188Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 38.
189See id. at 18; accord Panzani, supra note 77, at 4.
190See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 19-20.
191"The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty ...." Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 56, art. 234.
Article 234 further authorizes any court or tribunal of a member state, "if it considers that a
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, [to] request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling" on such a question. Id. Such a reference in the E.C.J. is mandatory
in a case pending before a national court of last resort. See id.
192See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 11-13; see also Eurofood-E.C.J, supra note 1
(acknowledging the filing of the questions referred by the Irish Supreme Court).
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within the meaning of the E.U. Regulation. 93 Second, the Court inquired
whether, if the January 27 proceedings were not sufficient to constitute such
a judgment, the relation-back provision in the Irish Companies Act made
the commencement effective as of January 27.194 Third, the Court inquired
whether the Parma court had jurisdiction to open main insolvency
proceedings where the company is registered in Ireland and conducts its
interests there on a regular basis.' 95 Fourth, the Court asked what factors
determine the location of a subsidiary's CoMI where it and its parent have
196

their respective registered offices in two different E.U. countries.
193The

Irish Supreme Court formulated the issue as follows:

Where a petition is presented to a court of competent jurisdiction in Ireland for the
winding up of an insolvent company and that court makes an order, pending the
making of an order for winding up, appointing a provisional liquidator with
powers to take possession of the assets of the company, manage its affairs, open a
bank account and appoint a solicitor all with the effect in law of depriving the
directors of the company of power to act, does that order combined with the
presentation of the petition constitute a judgment opening of insolvency
proceedings for the purposes of Article 16, interpreted in the light of Articles 1 and
2, of Council Regulation (E.C.) No 1346 of 2000?
Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 24-25.
194 The Irish Supreme Court framed the issue as follows:
If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, does the presentation, in Ireland, of a
petition to the High Court for the compulsory winding up of a company by the
court constitute the opening of insolvency proceedings for the purposes of that
Regulation by virtue of the Irish legal provision (section 220(2) of the Companies
Act, 1963) deeming the winding up of the company to commence at the date of the
presentation of the petition?
Id. at 25.
195 The Irish Supreme Court framed this inquiry as follows:
Does Article 3 of the said Regulation, in combination with Article 16, have the
effect that a court in a Member State[,] other than that in which the registered
office of the company is situated and other than where the company conducts the
administration of its interests on a regular basis in a manner ascertainable by third
parties, but where insolvency proceedings are first opened[,] has jurisdiction to
open main insolvency proceedings?
Id.

196The Irish Supreme Court posed the question this way:
Where (a) the registered offices of a parent company and its subsidiary are in two
different member states, (b) the subsidiary conducts the administration of its
interests on a regular basis in a manner ascertainable by third parties and in
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Finally, the Court asked the E.C.J. to determine whether the Irish courts
could invoke the public policy exception in the E.U. Regulation to deny
recognition to the opening of insolvency proceedings in Parma where the
rights to fair procedures and a fair hearing were violated and, in particular,
the provisional administrator was denied copies of the essential papers. 97
The Irish Supreme court declared that, "it is a matter of great urgency
to have rulings on these questions," and requested that the E.C.J. give
special priorit to them.19 8 However, the E.C.J. denied the request for
urgent review.' 99
The case was argued before the E.C.J. on June 12, 2005. Eight
countries (including Ireland and Italy), as well as the E.U. Commission,
took a sufficient interest in the case to file written observations with the
E.C.J., and all but three of the countries were represented at oral
argument. 200 The Advocate General of the E.C.J. issued an opinion on
September 27, 2005, in which he analyzed the arguments of the parties and
of the countries that appeared as amici curiae. The Advocate General
recommended that the E.C.J. issue a preliminary opinion that the Irish
courts were not required to recognize the opening of the Eurofood
complete and regular respect for its own corporate identity in the member state
where its registered office is situated and (c) the parent company is in a position,
by virtue of its shareholding and power to appoint directors, to control and does in
fact control the policy of the subsidiary, in determining the "centre of main
interests," are the governing factors those referred to at (b) above or on the other
hand those referred to at (c) above?
Id. at 12-25.
197The Irish Supreme Court framed the last question as follows:
Where it is manifestly contrary to the public policy of a Member State to permit a
judicial or administrative decision to have legal effect in relation to persons or
bodies whose right to fair procedures and a fair hearing has not been respected in
reaching such a decision, is that Member State bound, by virtue of Article 17 of
the said Regulation, to give recognition to a decision of the courts of another
Member State purporting to open insolvency proceedings in respect of a company,
in a situation where the court of the first Member State is satisfied that the decision
in question has been made in disregard of those principles and, in particular, where
the applicant in the second Member State has refused, in spite of requests and
contrary to the order of the court of the second Member State, to provide the
provisional liquidator of the company, duly appointed in accordance with the law
of the first Member State, with any copy of the essential papers grounding the
application?
Id. at 26.
'98 See id. at 24.

199 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1.
200 See E.C.J. A.G. Opinion, supra note 21,

45.
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insolvency case in Italy.2° '
H. The Italian Court of Appeals Decision
Mr. Farrell, acting for Eurofood and Bank of America, took appeals of
all of the relevant decisions as to both Eurofood and Parmalat SpA issued
by the Minister of Productive Activities and the Parma court, and requested
that all of these decisions be annulled. The Italian appellate court heard oral
argument on June 10, 2004 and dismissed the appeals by both parties by
judgment filed on July 16, 2004.2
The court noted that, if the appeal were successful, the Parma
proceedings would become secondary proceedings; if not, the Irish
proceedings were secondary proceedings. 20 3 The court also found it
significant that the Irish proceedings were brought by creditors for the sole
purpose of winding up the business
of Eurofood, with no concern for a
20 4
possible rescue of the enterprise.
The appellate court found that the opening of an Italian extraordinary
administration proceeding is a two-step process. First, a minister issues a
decree admitting a company into extraordinary administration. Second, the
court finds that the debtor is insolvent and establishes procedures for the
proceeding. 20 5 For Eurofood, the first step took place on February 9, 2004
and the second on February 20, 2004.
The Italian court further found that, for the purposes of mandatory
recognition under the E.U. Regulation, 206 no proceeding for Eurofood had
yet been opened in Ireland by those dates. The Dublin decision of January
27, 2004 was too limited to constitute the "opening" of a proceeding
pursuant to the provisions of Irish law, according to the Italian court,
because the Dublin court had only appointed a provisional liquidator as a
precautionary measure without going into the merits even in a summary
manner. 20 7 The Italian appellate court found that the March 15, 2004
Dublin decision, even if retroactive, could not take precedence over the
20 8
February decisions in the Parma court, which were already in full effect.
Thus, the court found, it did not matter whether the Irish court correctly
determined on March 15 that Eurofood's CoMI was located in Ireland (a
view with which the Italian appellate court disagreed).20 9
201

See id. 152.

202

See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip op. at 26.

See id. at 9-10.
See id. at 10.
205 See id. at 12-14.
206 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16(1).
203

204

207

See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip op. at 10-11.

208
209

See id. at 12.
See id.
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The court of appeal further found that the Italian legislature properly
enacted the December 23, 2003 legislation to deal with the financial crisis
of large groups of companies "that are global both in orientation and in
location.,, 2 The legislation granted the Minister of Productive Activities
the power to admit a company into extraordinary administration solely on
the basis of its control relationship with its parent in order to promote the
uniform reorganization of companies in the group, all of which are caught
up in the parent corporation's financial difficulties.21 '
The court of appeal rejected the bank's challenge to the admission of
Eurofood into extraordinary administration without notice to creditors, on
the grounds that the minister's decree to admit Eurofood into extraordinary
administration was a matter of utmost urgency that could not await
formalities of notice 2
The court further held that, in any event, the
initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding is not subject to objection by
creditors.21 3 Creditors would be allowed to seek an appropriate remedy
after the proceeding is initiated.21 4
The court also found that the extraordinary administrator properly has
the power to request extraordinary administration for subsidiary companies
because of the need for uniform management of the businesses belonging to
the group. 215 The court found that, given the public interest in maintaining
a large business, the fifth or sixth largest in Italy, subject to extraordinary
administration, "there is an obvious and undeniable need not to dissipate the
economic worth underlying the Group, which cannot be effectively realised
without a single insolvency procedure and uniform management of each
and every 2 business,
irrespective of the scale of the subsidiary
6
enterprises. 1
All of the evidence indicates that the Irish Supreme Court had no
knowledge of this Italian appellate opinion when it issued its own opinion
on July 27, 2004. There is no reference to this decision, or even to the fact
of the appeal of the Parma court's decision, in either of the decisions that
the Irish Supreme Court issued on July 27.

210

See id. at 15.

211

See id.
See id. at 24.

212

213 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip op. at 24.

United States law is similar. A

creditor may move for the dismissal of a bankruptcy proceeding on a variety of grounds.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(a) (liquidation case), 1112(b) (reorganization case). However,
no creditor is permitted to object at the outset to a voluntary filing by the debtor.
214 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 1, slip op. at 24. The procedure is the same in the
United States.
215 See id. at 25.
216

Id.
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IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE'S EUROFOOD DECISION
The E.C.J. answered four of the five questions posed by the Irish
Supreme Court.
The E.C.J. found that its answers made the second
2 17
question moot.

A. Factors in Determining the Location of a CoMI
The E.C.J. first addressed the factors that a court must consider, under
the E.U. Regulation, in determining the location of the CoMI. The E.C.J.
noted that the E.U. Regulation adopts a presumption that the CoMI is
located in the country of the corporation's registered office (which roughly
means the nation of its incorporation). 21s
According to the E.C.J., in determining the proper location of the
CoMI of a subsidiary, it is necessary to examine two sets of factors.2 19 The
first set of factors is the location where the subsidiary has regularly
administered its own interests, as ascertainable by third parties, and the
country in which it is incorporated. The second set of factors arises from
the location of the parent company which, by virtue of its ownership and
power to appoint directors, is able to control the policy decisions of the
subsidiary. Where, as in the Eurofood proceedings, these factors point to
different countries for the location of the
CoMI, the court must determine
220
the relative weight to give to each factor.
In the E.C.J.'s view, the European Union needs a uniform rule for
interpreting and applying the jurisdictional test of the debtor's CoMI. 22 1

There is no room for divergent national views on this issue. In part, the
E.C.J. based this determination on the fact that this concept is distinctive to
the E.U. Regulation and is otherwise unknown in the law of the E.U.
member countries.22 2
217 For the exact language of the second Irish Supreme Court question, which the E.C.J.
found moot, see supra note 196.
218 Most E.U. countries follow the "real seat" rule, which requires that a company's
registered office be in the same country as its headquarters. See, e.g., Christian Kersting,
CorporateChoice of Law-A Comparison of the United States and European Systems and a
Proposalfor a European Directive, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 36-38 (2002); Nicole Rothe,
Comment, Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons within the European Union: An
Analysis of the European Court of Justice Decision in the UberseeringCase, 53 AM. U. L.
REv. 1103, 1110 (2004). There are a few E.U. countries, such as the United Kingdom, that
permit a "letterbox company," which does not carry out any business in the country where its
registered office is located. See id. at n.48. In Eurofood-E.C.J, the E.C.J. stated that a
showing that a company is a "letterbox company" could refute the presumption that its CoMI
is located in the country of its registered office. See text accompanying infra notes 240-42.
219 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 27.
220 See id.
221 See id. 31.
222 See id. In fact, this assertion by the E.C.J. slightly overstates the facts.
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In determining the CoMI, the E.C.J. ruled that where a parent and a
subsidiary have registered offices in different E.U. countries, the
presumption that the CoMI of the subsidiary is located in the country where
its registered office is situated can be rebutted only "if factors which are
both objective and ascertainable by third parties enable it to be established
that an actual situation exists which is different from that which location at
that registered office is deemed to reflect., 223 The E.C.J. stated that such
rebuttal could be made if the subsidiary is not carrying out any business in
the territory of the country where its registered office is located.224 In
contrast, where a subsidiary carries on its business in the country where its
registered office is situated, "the mere fact that its economic choices are or
can be controlled by a parent company in another Member '225
State is not
enough to rebut the presumption laid down by that Regulation."
The E.C.J. stated that the determination of the location of a debtor's
CoMI must be based on criteria that are both objective and ascertainable by
third parties.226 If E.U. countries do not follow a uniform interpretation, the
CoMI concept cannot serve its function of determining in which country a
main insolvency case belongs and which country's law will govern the
insolvency proceeding. 227 Inconsistent interpretations of the CoMI concept
can lead to dueling jurisdiction between countries for the main proceeding
of a debtor, as in fact happened in the Eurofood case.
The E.C.J. turned to the thirteenth recital of the E.U. Regulation to
define the scope of the concept of CoMI. 228 This recital states, "the centre
of main interests should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts
the administration of [its] interests on a regular basis and is therefore
ascertainable by third parties., 229 The E.C.J. treated this recital as a
definition that "shows that the centre of main interests must be identified by
reference to criteria that are both objective and ascertainable by third
91230
parties.
The E.C.J. found that both objectivity and ascertainability third parties
countries have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 10, which uses the CoMI

concept in the same way as in the E.U. Regulation. The United Kingdom (excepting
Northern Ireland) adopted the law effective April 4, 2006, less than a month before the
E.C.J. issued its Eurofood decision. In contrast, Poland adopted its version of the Model
Law effective October 1, 2003, and it was already in place when Poland became an E.U.
member effective May 1, 2004.
223 Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 37.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 See id.

33.

227 See id.
228 See id.

32.

229 E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, comt. 13 (internal quotations omitted).
230 Eurofood-E.CJ., supra note 1, 33.
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were necessary to achieve an important goal of the E.U. Regulation: "to
ensure legal certainty and foreseeability concerning the determination of the
court with jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings. 2 3 1 The E.C.J.
further found that objectivity and forseeability are particularly important,
given that the determination of the court with jurisdiction to open a main
proceeding also determines which country's law will govern the
232
proceeding.
The relevant third parties are typically the debtor's major creditors and
its employees. As in the Eurofood proceeding, third parties may have
undertaken considerable effort in exercising due diligence to assure
themselves as to the location of the debtor's CoMI. These third parties
would have an interest in reasonably predicting in advance where a main
insolvency proceeding would properly be filed, what country's substantive
law and procedural rules would govern the proceeding, and whether the
subsidiary's insolvency proceeding might become entangled in a far larger
proceeding of the corporate group of which the subsidiary is a part.
The weight that the E.C.J. gave to Recital 13, as an integral substantive
provision of the Regulation, is remarkable. Normally, as a matter of
construction, a recital would be treated as explanatory commentary, and not
the source of a substantive rule of law, let alone a rule of such importance
as the definition of CoMI. The recitals that now appear at the beginning of
the E.U. Regulation were not included in the draft treaty that was converted
into the E.U. Regulation. 233 The recitals were added at the time of
conversion of the text to a regulation, presumably by the E.U.
234 staff and
perhaps with help from the countries sponsoring the conversion.
1. Presumption that CoMI is Located in Country of Registered Office
After examining the interests of third parties, principally consisting in
the creditors of a debtor filing an insolvency proceeding, the E.C.J. turned
to a consideration of the possible rebuttal of the presumption that the CoMI
is located in the country where the registered office is located.2 35 Because
Eurofood's registered office was located in Dublin, the Article 3(1)

231

Id.

See id.
See European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35
I.L.M. 1223, reprintedin 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75, 75 (1997). The draft treaty had only four
232
233

brief introductory paragraphs, which were replaced with four different introductory
paragraphs in the Regulation that precede the present thirty-three recitals at the beginning of
the Regulation.
234 According to the introductory paragraphs, it was principally Germany and Finland
whose efforts led to the conversion of the draft treaty into a regulation after it failed to obtain
the necessary signatures for adoption as a treaty.
235

See Eurofood-E.C.J.,supra note 1,

34-37.
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23 6
presumption unquestionably placed its CoMI in Ireland.

2. Rebuttal of Presumption

Under U.S. law, there are a variety of ways of treating a presumption
and its possible rebuttal. First, a presumption may be treated as a "bursting
bubble" that disappears as soon as evidence is introduced that is sufficient
to support a contrary inference.2 37 Second, a presumption may shift the
burden of going forward in presenting evidence at trial, but not shift the
ultimate burden of proof.23 8 Third, while not shifting the burden of proof, a
presumption may be taken into account in weighing the evidence. 39
Fourth, a presumption may shift the burden of proof to the party against
whom the presumption operates. 240 Fifth, a presumption may be rebuttable
only by clear and convincing evidence.24' Sixth, rebuttal may not be
permitted at all.242 The existing authority in domestic E.U. courts on the
on the location of a debtor's
effect of the E.U. Regulation's presumption 243
CoMI is unclear and not altogether consistent.
236 For the text of E.U. Regulation Article 3(1), see supra note 127.
237 This is known as the Thayer-Wigmore theory of a presumption.

See, e.g., 21B

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

5122.1, at 428 (2005) (citing JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940) and
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 336 (1898)); CAL. EvID.
CODE § 604 (West 2006) ("The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing
evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless
and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which
case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from
the evidence and without regard to the presumption.").
238 This is the position taken by the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID.
301 ("A presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial
upon the party on whom it was originally cast.").
239 See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 237, § 5722.1, at 435-38 (designating this
effect of a presumption as the "California Heresy").
240 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 606 (West 2006) ("The effect of a presumption affecting
the burden of proof is to impose upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof
as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact.").
241 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C) (2005) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to
rebut the presumption that a bankruptcy case filed by an individual is not in good faith, if the
individual had a prior case that was dismissed within a year before the filing).
242See, e.g., Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383, 1389
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (under California law, a substantial relationship between work that an
attorney has performed for a former client and his or her work for a current client in
opposition to the former client creates an irrebuttable presumption that the attorney has
received confidential information from the former client. That creates a conflict of interest
disqualifying the lawyer from the work for the current client).
243 See Bob Wessels, The Place of the Registered Office ofa Company: A Cornerstonein
the Application of the E.C. Insolvency Regulation, 3 EUR. COMPANY L. (KLUWER) 183, 184-
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3. E. C.J.Decision on Rebuttal Requirements
The question in the Eurofood-E.C.J case is whether the presumption
can be rebutted by evidence of the location of the4parent company and its
control over the policy decisions of the subsidiary.
In its decision, the E.C.J. gave a clear answer on the proper kind of
evidence to consider in an attempted rebuttal of the presumption that a
debtor's CoMI coincides with its registered office. The E.C.J. found that
rebuttal must be based on factors that are both objective and discernible by
third parties. 245 For example, the E.C.J. stated, such rebuttal could be
successful for a "letterbox" company that is not carrying on any business in
the country where its registered office is located.246 In contrast, the E.C.J.
stated, if a company carries out its business in an E.U. country where its
registered office is located, the location of its CoMI cannot be rebutted by
evidence that its economic choices
are or can be controlled by a parent
247
company in another E.U. country.
While the E.C.J. opinion does not draw out the consequences of its
decision on the Eurofood controversy,248 the implications are clear. The
presumption that Eurofood's CoMI was located in Ireland, because its
registered office was located there, was supported by the evidence of the
expectations of its major creditors. Given this evidence, the location of its
parent corporation Parmalat SpA in Italy was insufficient to rebut the
presumption.
Thus, the E.C.J. supported the Dublin High Court's decision, that
Eurofood's CoMI was located in Ireland. In contrast, in deciding that
Eurofood's CoMI was in Italy, the Italian courts improperly based their
decisions on the fact that Eurofood's important economic decisions were
made by the Parmalat corporate decision makers in Italy.
The E.C.J. did not answer the question of the quantity of evidence
required to rebut the presumption that a debtor's CoMI is located in the
country of its registered office or the consequence of presenting some

86 (2006) [hereinafter Wessels, Registered Office] (discussing cases); Raimon, supra note
48, at 750.
244 See Eurofood-E.C., supra note 1, $ 27. While the evidence presented on this subject
in the Dublin High Court and in the Parma court is not available, apparently it varied
enormously.
245 Id. 34.
246 See id. 35.
247 See id.
36-37.
248 One function of the distinctive nature of the reference of preliminary questions to the
E.C.J. is that its jurisdiction is limited to answering the questions presented. The national (or
lower) court referring the question then applies the answer to the case in front of it, and the
decision carries the weight of the domestic court rather than the E.C.J. See generally Weiler,
supra note 62, at 2421.
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evidence of the proper sort. The E.C.J. did not decide whether the
presumption should have any weight once contrary evidence is presented,
or whether it shifts the burden of proof or the burden of producing
evidence.2 49
B. Jurisdiction to Open Main Proceedings in a Non-CoMI E.U. Country
The E.C.J. next took up the issue of whether a court in an E.U. country
has jurisdiction to review the decision of a court of another E.U. country
that has opened a main insolvency proceeding where (a) the company's
registered office is not located in the country of the first court, and (b) from
the viewpoint of third parties, the location where the debtor's conduct of the
administration of its interests on a regular basis is also not in the country of
the first court.2 50 The point of this question was to inquire whether Articles
321 and 16212 of the E.U. Regulation mandate the recognition of the
decision of the first court to open a main proceeding, where that court
2 5 3 lacks
jurisdiction, pursuant to the Regulation, to open such a proceeding.
The E.C.J. stated the general principle as follows:
[O]n a proper interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1)
of the Regulation, the main insolvency proceedings opened by a
court of a Member State must be recognised by the courts of the
able to review the
other Member States, without the latter being
254
jurisdiction of the court of the opening State.
Mutual trust, the E.C.J. said, is the principle governing the recognition
of the opening of a main proceeding in another E.U. country and the
priority granted by Article 16 to the first court decision opening a case. 5
By corollary to the principle of mutual trust, the E.C.J. stated, the E.U.
249 Professor Wessels argues that the function of the presumption is to allocate the burden
of proof. See Wessels, Registered Office, supra note 243, at 185. Furthermore, he contends
that the presumption assists in the resolution of doubts where the evidence is unclear. See id.
It remains to be seen whether this view of the presumption will prevail in light of the
Eurofood-E.C.J. decision.
250 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 38.
25 1 For the text of E.U. Regulation art. 3, see supra note 127.

252 Automatic recognition of a proceeding opened under Article 3 is required by E.U.
Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16(1), which provides: "Any judgment opening insolvency
proceedings handed down by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 3 shall be recognized in all other Member States from the time that it becomes
effective in the State of the opening of proceedings."
253 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 38. The same issue could arise in another E.U.
country which has no claim to hosting the debtor's CoMI, but where a party in interest may
wish judicial assistance in connection with the debtor's insolvency proceeding.
254 Id. 44.
255 See id. 39.
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countries have waived "the right to apply their internal rules on recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechanism
for the recognition and enforcement of decisions handed down in the
context of insolvency proceedings. ..
Thus, once a decision2 57 opening
a main proceeding is made in one E.U. country, 258 the principle of mutual
trust requires courts in other E.U. countries to recognize that decision and
prevents them from reviewing the assessment that the first court made as to
its jurisdiction.2 59
The E.C.J. stated that the proper avenue to challenge such a
determination is to invoke the remedies available under the law of the
country where the opening decision was made (i.e., make an application for
reconsideration in the court that made the decision to open a main
proceeding, or to take an appeal to a higher court in that country).2 6 °
However, the E.C.J. recognized two procedural qualifications to the
recognition requirement based on the principle of trust. First, a court
opening a main insolvency proceeding must examine whether the debtor's
CoMI is located in that country.2 6' Second, "such an examination must...
comply with the essential procedural guarantees required for a fair legal
process ....

,62

If a decision opening a main insolvency proceeding does

not meet these procedural requirements, the principle of mutual trust does
not apply, and recognition is not required. The E.C.J. expanded on these
issues later in its opinion.26 3
C. Consequence of Appointing a Provisional Liquidator
The E.C.J. next turned to the first question posed by the Irish Supreme
Court, whether the Dublin court's appointment of a provisional liquidator
constituted "a decision opening insolvency proceedings" for Eurofood,
within the meaning of Article 16(1).264 The E.C.J. recognized that priority,
for recognition purposes under Article 16(1), is based on which decision to
See id. 40.
In this context, "decision opening" a main proceeding has the same meaning as
"judgment opening" a main proceeding. E.U. Regulation art. 16 refers to a "judgment
opening insolvency proceedings." See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16. Preamble 22
gives the same meaning both to "judgments concerning the opening ... of insolvency
proceedings" and to "decision[s] ... to open proceedings .
Id. pmbl. 22. In EurofoodE. C.J., the court uses these terms interchangeably.
258 If the country first opening a main insolvency proceeding for a debtor is not an E.U.
country, the mandate for recognition of such a decision does not apply.
259 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 42.
260 See id. 43.
256

257

261

See id. 41.

262

Id.
See discussion in text infra notes 280-312.
Eurofood-E.CJ, supra note 1, 45.

263
264
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open a main proceeding is handed down first.265 However, the Regulation
does not define with sufficient precision what constitutes a "decision to
open insolvency proceedings. 26 6
This problem arose in the Eurofood cases because Irish law lacks a
step in the commencement of an insolvency proceeding that is designated as
a "decision to open" such a proceeding.2 67 Furthermore, under Irish law,
the precise point where an insolvency proceeding is opened, for the
purposes of the E.U. Regulation, apparently varies from case to case.
The E.C.J. decided to bypass this formal gap and to focus on the
substance of what constitutes a decision to open an insolvency proceeding.
The E.C.J. ruled on this issue as follows:
[O]n a proper interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1)
of the Regulation, a decision to open insolvency proceedings for the
purposes of that provision is a decision handed down by a court of a
Member State to which application for such a decision has been
made, based on the debtor's insolvency and seeking the opening of
proceedings referred to in Annex A to the Regulation, where that
decision involves the divestment of the debtor and the appointment
of a liquidator referred to in Annex C to the Regulation. Such
divestment implies that the debtor loses the powers of management
that he has over his assets.268
Thus, for the application of the E.U. Regulation, Article 1(1)269
requires that a national insolvency proceeding have four characteristics: (1)
it must be a collective proceeding, (2) it must be based on the debtor's
insolvency, (3) it must result in at least a partial divestment of the debtor,
and (4) it must involve the appointment of a liquidator.27 ° Whether a statute
qualifies under this provision is not left to speculation: Annex A to the
Regulation specifies the statutes for each E.U. country (except Denmark,
where the E.U. Regulation is not applicable) that meet this qualification,
and Annex C lists the titles of the liquidators in each country who meet the
definition in Article 2(b).2 7 '
265 See id. 49.
266 See id. 50.

267 The negotiator from Ireland should have had this issue resolved in the negotiation of
the text of the draft insolvency convention that was converted into the E.U. Regulation with
no relevant changes. One could say that this resulted from a failure of diplomacy.
268 Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 58.
269 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. (1)(1), which provides: "This Regulation shall
apply to collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a
debtor and the appointment of a liquidator."
270 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 46.
271 E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(b) defines a liquidator as, "any person or body
whose function is to administer or liquidate assets of which the debtor has been divested or
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The E.C.J. held that a decision to open an insolvency proceeding under
the law of an E.U. country includes any decision under a statutory scheme
referred to in Annex A that meets the formal criteria of Article 1(1) and
appoints a liquidator of the kind specified in Annex C.2 72 It does not matter,
the E.C.J. held, that the liquidator is initially appointed on an interim
basis.273
The E.C.J. noted that the conditions and formalities for opening an
insolvency proceeding are determined by domestic national law, and not the
E.U. Regulation, and they vary considerably from one E.U. country to
another.2 4 In some E.U. countries, insolvency proceedings are opened very
soon after the submission of an application, especially if the application is
submitted by the debtor and is unopposed. In other countries, by contrast, it
may take a substantial period of time before a decision to open a case is
issued, even in an unopposed case filed by the debtor.2 75 The E.C.J. also
noted that a "provisional" opening may be in place for several months.276
The E.C.J. declared that, in order to assure the effectiveness of the
recognition provisions of the E.U. Regulation, it is necessary that the
obligation of recognition apply as soon as possible in the course of the
proceedings.27 7 The E.C.J. noted that the principle that only one main
proceeding is permitted would suffer serious disruption if competing courts
could claim concurrent jurisdiction for a main proceeding over an extended
period.278 Thus, the phrase "decision to open insolvency proceedings" must
be interpreted in light of the objective of assuring the effectiveness of the
Regulation.27 9
For example, the urgency of recognition is highlighted in the context
of the application of the moratorium or automatic stay resulting from the
filing of an insolvency case in an E.U. country. Article 16(1) exports the
home country moratorium (i.e., that of the country where the case is filed)
in a main proceeding to all other E.U. countries.go A court in another
to supervise the administration of his affairs. Those persons and bodies are listed in Annex
C." This list must be updated by the European Union to reflect recent changes in national
insolvency laws in E.U. countries.
272 See Eurofood-E.C.J, supra note 1,
54, 58.
273 See id. 55.
274 See id. 51.
275 See id. France, for example, typically requires approximately three weeks for a court
to open an insolvency proceeding.
276 See id.
277 See id. 52.
278 See Eurofood-E.C.J, supra note 1, 52.
279 See id. 53.
280 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16(l), which provides: "Any judgment opening
insolvency proceedings handed down by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 3 shall be recognised in all the other Member States from the time that it
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country needs to know immediately if a proceeding either pending when the
first main insolvency case is filed or commenced thereafter is subject to the
home country moratorium. Similarly, such a court needs to know whether
assets that may be involved in its own case are in custodia legis in the home
country court.
The Italian administrator and the Italian government had
acknowledged that the temporary liquidator appointed for Eurofood by the
Dublin High Court on January 27, 2004 was an administrator of the kind
specified in Annex C. Nonetheless, they argued that Article 38 of the E.U.
Regulation granted powers to such an administrator to apply for
preservative measures "for the period between the request for the opening
of insolvency proceedings and the judgment opening the proceedings."2
Thus, they argued, the appointment of such an administrator could not open
the insolvency proceeding.2 82
The E.C.J. rejected this construction. It found instead that this
provision applies to a temporary administrator in an insolvency case that is
not yet open because the home court has not yet ordered that the debtor be
divested of its roperty or the temporary administrator is not an Annex C
administrator. 28V The purpose of Article 38, the E.C.J. found, was to permit
this type of administrator, though not authorized to request the opening of a
secondary proceeding in another country, 284 to apply for preservative
measures in that country pending receipt of full authority. 28 5 Thus, this
provision did not assist the Italian assertion of jurisdiction over a main case
for Eurofood.2 86
In light of this conclusion, the E.C.J. found it unnecessary to address
the Irish Supreme Court's second question, premised on a contrary finding

becomes effective in the State of the opening of proceedings."
281 E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 38 provides:
Where the court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3(1)
appoints a temporary administrator in order to ensure the preservation of the
debtor's assets, that temporary administrator shall be empowered to request any
measures to secure and preserve any of the debtor's assets situated in another
Member State, provided for under the law of that State, for the period between the
request for the opening of insolvency proceedings and the judgment opening the
proceedings.
282 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 56.
283 See id.

57.

284 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 29.
285 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, T 57.
286 The E.C.J. did not in fact make this final finding. It confined its decision to the
abstract issues presented by the Irish Supreme Court, and left it to the national courts to draw
the appropriate conclusions about the Eurofood case.
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on the first question, of whether the relation-back, under Irish law, of the
Dublin court's March 23, 2004 decision opening a main insolvency
proceeding for Eurofood prevented an intervening Italian court decision
opening a main insolvency proceeding for the same debtor from taking
priority.287

However, the E.C.J.'s failure to address this question left a gap in this
analysis. The Irish Supreme Court presumably wanted to be able to rule
that the Dublin decision on January 27, 2004 prevented the Italian court in
Parma from opening a main proceeding for Eurofood in February 2004.
The E.C.J. did not make such a ruling, and such a result cannot be inferred
from what the E.C.J. did decide. Instead the Irish Supreme Court will have
to rely on288the E.C.J.'s "equality of arms" analysis to reach this
conclusion.
D. Impact of Procedural Irregularities on Recognition Obligation
In its fifth question, the Irish Supreme Court asked the E.C.J. to
determine whether it was required to recognize an insolvency proceeding
opened in another E.U. country where the procedure leading to the decision
disregarded procedural rules guaranteed by the public policy of the country
where the court is located. In responding to this question, the E.C.J.
addressed both considerations of fair legal process and the public policy
exception to the requirements of the E.U. Regulation.2 89 Because of the
complexity of these issues, I address them separately infra.29 °
E. Subsequent Irish Supreme Court Decision
After the E.C.J. issued its Eurofood decision, the Irish Supreme Court
dismissed the Eurofood appeal on2 91the grounds that the E.C.J. decision had
fully resolved the issues before it.

287 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 59.

See infra text at notes 323-30.
289 E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 26 provides:
288

Any Member State may refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened in
another Member State or to enforce a judgment handed down in the context of
such proceedings where the effects of such recognition or enforcement would be
manifestly contrary to that State's public policy, in particular its fundamental
principles or the constitutional rights and liberties of the individual.
290 See infra text at notes 299-312 (fair legal process) and 350-59 (public policy).
291See In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., [2006] IESC 41 (Ir.).
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V. "EQUALITY OF ARMS," FAIR PROCEDURES, AND DUE
PROCESS
Perhaps the most surprising part of the E.C.J.'s discussion of fair
procedures in the CoMI decision making process is its reference to the
principle of "equality of arms," a subcategory of fair procedure
requirements under E.U. law. The principle of "equality of arms" gave the
E.C.J. the legal tools to address some of the procedural
issues raised by the
2 92
Irish Supreme Court in its submission to the E.C.J.
I have previously written, while the E.C.J. Eurofood decision was
pending, that the E.U. Regulation needs both substantive and procedural
improvements to provide adequately for a fair and reasonable decisionmaking process in the determination of the CoMI of a business entity.2 93 In
Part VI, I consider the impact of the E.C.J. Eurofood decision on my
arguments that the E.U. Regulation needs substantive revisions to
accommodate corporate groups 294 and to better define the factors to
consider in the CoMI analysis.295
I have also argued that the E.U. Regulation needs a set of procedural
improvements, including procedures for making the CoMI determination, a
better definition of what constitutes a "judgment opening insolvency
proceedings," which is entitled to automatic recognition,29 6 and a package
of "due process" rights.2 97
More generally, I argued that the E.U.
Regulation needs procedural rules for its application. I have further argued
that these rules should be adopted on an E.U.-wide basis, 298 so that they
would not be subject299
to domestic rule-making that may adopt inconsistent
and inadequate rules.
Given the existing Irish and E.U. law, the Irish Supreme Court thought
that it could only find an answer to these procedural problems in the "public
policy" exception to the mandatory recognition and enforcement of
judgment provisions in the E.U. Regulation.' ° ° The E.C.J. found a better
solution to the problem. By invoking the "equality of arms" principle based

292

In my article on the Eurofood case that I published before the E.C.J. decision, I did

not foresee the use of this principle to address procedural issues raised by the Irish Supreme
Court in its submission. See Samuel L. Bufford, InternationalInsolvency Case Venue in the
European Union: The Parmalatand Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 429,

464-84 (2006).
293 See id.

294 See infra text at notes 360-70.
295See infra text at notes 378-413; see also Bufford, supra note 292, at 464-71.
296 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16(1).
297See Bufford, supra note 292, at 482-84.
298See id. at 471.
299 See id.

300 See Eurofood-E.C.J, supra note 1,

61-64, discussed infra at notes 360-70.
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on E.U. law, the E.C.J. found a solution to the procedural problem based on
E.U. law, not Irish law. It is E.U. law (the "equality of arms" principle
embodied in the Treaty of Amsterdam), the E.C.J. ruled, that permits the
Irish Supreme Court to deny recognition to the order of the Parma court

opening a main proceeding for Eurofood.3 °'
I also did not appreciate that the E.C.J. had an arrow in its quiver to
address at least some of the due process concerns that the Irish Supreme
Court and I had raised. This arrow is embodied in the concept of "equality
of arms," which the E.C.J. relied on in its Eurofood decision to deal with
some of the due process kinds of problems.
30 2
The concept of "equality of arms" is unknown in U.S. law.
However, the E.C.J. has used this concept on a number of occasions in
commercial law cases. 30

3

Most of the E.C.J. commercial law cases either

involve competition law or administrative law disputes with the European
Union.3 °4

As applied to the Eurofood case, the principle has important
consequences in a number of European countries with respect to their
procedures in making decisions on the location of the CoMI in an
international insolvency case.

301 Id. % 60-65.
302

But see Jay Sterling Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New

Constitutional Right, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1007 (arguing for the adoption of a new
constitutional right of equality of arms to balance criminal trials more evenly between
prosecutor and defendant).
303 A database search of E.C.J. cases on the website of the British and Irish Legal
Information Institute using the "equality of arms" phrase yielded fifty-five cases (including
the Eurofood-E.C.J. case). See BAILII Court of Justice of the European Communities
(including Court of First Instance Decisions), http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ.
304 See id. All but two of the E.C.J. "equality of arms" decisions involved E.U.
regulatory action (twenty-nine involved E.U. competition law). For a description of the
operation of the "equality of arms" concept in E.U. regulatory law, see In re Microsoft
Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The remaining case, apart from EurofoodE.C.J., is Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugessellschaft & Co. KG v.
Hofstetter, 2004 O.J. C106/12, 2004 E.C.J. Celex Lexis 393 (Apr. 1, 2004), where the E.C.J.
found that a national court (in Germany) must decide whether a consumer contract for a
parking space in a multi-story garage was unfair, and thus violated the "equality of arms"
principle, insofar as it required payment in full upon receipt of a bank performance guarantee
(with default interest if not paid timely) before the structure was built. In one other case,
Case C-276/01, Steffensen, 2003 O.J. C135/6, 2004 E.C.J. Celex Lexis 146 (Apr. 10, 2003),
which arose from the application of an E.U. regulation in a German court against a sausage
manufacturer whose sausages were improperly labeled, the production supervisor challenged
the evidence seized in retail outlets on the grounds of "equality of arms" because the
remaining portions of the production run had been sold and could not be tested. The E.C.J.
ruled that the domestic court must determine, based on the facts of the particular case,
whether the "equality of arms" principle was satisfied.
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A. E.C.J. Procedural Rulings
"Fair legal process" is an important issue in the Eurofood cases. The
Dublin High Court took sufficient time to give Dr. Bondi, the Italian
administrator appointed in the Italian Eurofood case (and also in all the
other Parmalat cases filed in Italy), a full and fair opportunity to be heard
before deciding that the Dublin case was the main case for Eurofood. In
contrast, Dr. Bondi gave notice to Mr. Farrell, the Irish provisional
liquidator, at 5:15 p.m. on a Friday afternoon, of the Parma hearing on the
opening of a main proceeding that was scheduled (and took place) the
following Tuesday at noon. Furthermore, Dr. Bondi refused to provide to
Mr. Farrell copies of the voluminous papers that he had filed in the Parma
court.
The E.C.J. found that the general principle that everyone is entitled to
a fair legal process is well established in E.C.J. jurisprudence. 30 5 This
principle, according to the E.C.J., "is inspired by the fundamental rights
which form an integral part of the general principles of Community law
which the [E.C.J.] enforces ....

The principle is also inspired, the

stated,30 7

E.C.J.
by the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States and by the guidelines supplied by the ECHR.3 °8 More particularly,
the right to be heard, including the right to receive documents filed with a
court, "occup[ies] an eminent position in the organisation and conduct of a
fair legal process.
In the context of insolvency proceedings, the E.C.J.
found that these rights are provided by the principle of "equality of arms,"
to which we now turn.
B. The E.C.J. Language on "Equality of Arms" in Eurofood
In Eurofood, the E.C.J. was quite terse in its reference to the "equality
of arms" principle. The Court stated:
In the context of insolvency proceedings, the right of creditors or
their representatives to participate in accordance with the equality of
arms principle is of particular importance. Though the specific
detailed rules concerning the right to be heard may vary according to
the urgency for a ruling to be given, any restriction on the exercise of
that right must be duly justified and surrounded by procedural
guarantees ensuring that persons concerned by such proceedings
305 See Eurofood-E.C.,
supra note 1, 65 (citing Case C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe v.
Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 1-8417, n 20-21; Joined Cases C-174/98 & C-189/98, Netherlands v.
Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. I-1, 1 17; Case C-7/98, Krombach, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1935, T 26).
306 Id.
307 Id.

308 See ECHR, supra note 145.
309

Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, $ 66.
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actually 3have
the opportunity to challenge the measures adopted in
10
urgency.

We turn now to unpacking the "equality of arms" concept, insofar as it
applies in insolvency cases.
C. Origins of "Equality of Arms": European Convention on Human Rights
"Equality of arms" is a legal concept of ancient origin, 311 and has its
modem home in European and international criminal procedure. 31 z The
concept finds its modem European origins in Article 6 of the ECHR, which
was adopted by the Council of Europe
in 1952. 3 14
1. Convention Language

Article 6 of the ECHR provides:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public

310

See id.

311 The "equality of arms" principle arose in the context of the trial by wager of battle,
which, according to Blackstone, traces back to "the earliest times," including the laws of
Gundebald in AD 501. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *337. Such a trial
could be used in military, criminal, or civil cases. See id. Blackstone describes the
armament permitted: the representatives of each side "are dressed in a suit of armour, with
red sandals, barelegged from the knee downwards, bareheaded, and with bare arms to the
elbows." Id. at *339. The only weapons allowed were three-foot batons or staves, and a
four-cornered leather "target." Id. The battle, which took place before judges sitting in court
on a specially designated field, was fought from sunrise "till the stars appear in the evening."
Id. at *340. It rarely resulted in the death of one of the combatants. Id. at *339. Blackstone
declares that such a trial was still "law at this day [1769]," although the last such trial had
occurred in 1638. Id. at *338.
312 See, e.g., MALGORZATA WASEK-WADEREK, THE PRINCIPLE OF "EQUALITY OF ARMS"
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ITS FUNCTIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

(Leuven Univ. Press) (2000); Frangois Falletti, Equality of Arms in French Criminal
Procedure,http://www.iap.nl.com/speeches/ 2000_h.html (last visited July 5, 2006). For a
description of the more liberal interpretation given to the right of "equality of arms" in
international criminal tribunals, see James Meernik, Equality of Arms? The Individual vs.
The InternationalCommunity in War Crimes Tribunals, 86 JUDICATURE 312, 315 (2003); see
also Alexander Knoops, The Dichotomy Between Judicial Economy and Equality of Arms
within International and Internationalized Criminal Trials: A Defense Perspective, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1566 (2006); Stefania Negri, The Principle of "Equality of Arms " and
the Evolving Law of InternationalCriminalProcedure,5 INT'L. CRIM. L. REV. 513 (2005).
313 The Council of Europe is both the oldest and the largest of the European international
organizations. It has forty-six members, including all of the E.U. member countries. The
European Court of Human Rights is a Council of Europe institution.
314 See ECHR, supra note 145. Each of the forty-six members of the Council of Europe,

including all of the E.U. members, has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights.
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hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial
in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests ofjustice.
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and
in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter
if he cannot
35
understand or speak the language used in court. M
As is evident in the foregoing text, "equality of arms" is not a right
overtly enumerated in Article 6. However, it is generally recognized
as an
316
uncodified element of the right to a fair trial provided in Article 6..
Thus,
Article 6 makes "equality of arms" a core element of the adversary criminal
process 3 17 in the forty-six member countries of the Council of Europe
(which includes all of the E.U. member countries).
In the criminal context, the "equality of arms" principle gives three
rights to a defendant in a criminal trial: (1) the right to a full and fair
opportunity to present the facts of his or her case to the court; (2) the right
311

Id. art. 6.

316

Id.
See, e.g., J.E.S.

317

FAWCETr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF

137 (Oxford Univ. Press) (1969); see also Kingsley E. Belle, Equality of
Arms-a Significant Aspect of Fairness in International Criminal Justice,
http:/ihttp://64.118.85.12/-slcmp/opinion_article.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2007) ("The
principle of equality of arms is classified as a sub-principle of fairness, whereby the accuser
and the accused must be treated equally before the law.").
HUMAN RIGHTS,

396
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to present the defendant's legal arguments to the court; and (3) the right to
respond to the evidence and the legal arguments presented by the
prosecution. 318
2. The Belziuk Case

A leading European case for the application of the principle of
"equality of arms" is the 1998 decision of the European Court on Human
Rights 319 in Belziuk v. Poland,320 the first Polish criminal case to come
before that court.
The defendant in that case was convicted of attempting to steal an
automobile, and was sentenced to three years in prison. Having taken an
appeal and not being represented by counsel, he requested that he be
brought to the appellate court hearing. The court of appeal denied this
request on the grounds that he had argued his position in writing and he had
already explained in detail his version of the facts in the trial court. 321
The Court found three principles deriving from Article 6(1) and (3)(c)
that applied to the Belziuk case. First, criminal proceedings form a single
entity from beginning to end, and the protection provided by Article 6 does
not end at the trial court.322 Second, while as a general rule the right to a
fair hearing requires that the accused be present at trial, it does not
necessarily entail rights to a public hearing of an appeal and a right to be
present in person.32 Instead, at the appellate level the court must consider
"the special features of the proceedings involved and the manner in which
the [defense's] interests are presented and protected before the appellate
court, particularly in the light of the issues to be decided by it and their
importance for the appellant. 32 4
Third, in the opinion of the Court, the principle of "equality of arms,"
as a feature of the requirement for a fair trial, requires that both the
prosecution and the defense be given "the opportunity to have knowledge of
See, e.g., WASEK-WIADEREK, supra note 312, at 23.
319 There is no right under the ECHR for an individual to bring a claim against that
318

person's own country. See ECHR, supra note 145, art. 33 (specifying that a case may be
brought before the European Court on Human Rights only by High Contracting Parties (i.e.,
countries that have ratified the Convention) or the European Commission on Human Rights
(the Commission)). However, the Commission may receive a petition from such an
individual, if the country at issue has declared that it recognizes the competence of the
Commission to receive such petitions. See id. art. 34. The Commission, in turn, may
forward the petition to the European Court on Human Rights. See, e.g., Belziuk v. Poland,
1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
320 Belziuk, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 11.
321 Id. at 3.
322 Id. at 10.

321 Id. at 11.
324

Id.
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and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the
other party. 32 5 Conceivably, the Court stated, national law may provide for
this principle in various ways. 326 However, in this case, if the defendant
had been present at the hearing, he could have challenged the submissions
of the prosecutor and presented evidence in support of his appeal.327
Because the defendant was denied this opportunity, the Court found that the
principle of "equality of arms," as implicitly embedded in Article 6, was
violated.32 8
D. "Equality of Arms" in the Insolvency Context
In its Eurofood decision, the E.C.J. does not explain how the concept
of "equality of arms" applies in the insolvency context. However, from its
use in the criminal procedure context, we can distill the following. The
"equality of arms" principle requires that each party in interest in an
insolvency case be given a full and fair opportunity to present both the facts
and the law on its side, and, equally, that it be given a full and fair
opportunity to comment on the evidence and legal arguments of an
opponent.
One of the important issues that the Irish Supreme Court submitted to
the E.C.J. was its perception that the Parma court had violated Mr. Farrell's
rights. Dr. Bondi had refused to provide copies of the papers that he had
filed in the Parma case in connection with the Parma court's hearing and
determination that it had jurisdiction to open a main insolvency proceeding
for Eurofood.329
Providing a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and law and to
comment on the other side's submissions can be difficult with respect to
urgently needed judicial decisions at the outset of an insolvency case. As
the Eurofood-Dublin case illustrates, it is often necessary in a business
reorganization case to obtain orders from the court on a variety of subjects
as soon as the case begins.330 In the
3 31 United States, these orders are
commonly known as "first day orders.

325Id.
326

Beiziuk, 1998-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, at 11.

327

Id. at 12.
Id.

328
329
330

See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, at 5 (submission 5).
See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 1, slip. op. at 4-8 (court appointed temporary

liquidator on the day that the case was filed); In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562

(Ch.), 2003 WL 21353254 Ch. (May 16, 2003) (U.K.), at *2-*4 (determining that England
was the location of the CoMI for fourteen European subsidiaries of Daisytek, Inc.)
[hereinafter Daisytek-Leeds].
331See generally JAMES F. QUEENAN, JR. ET AL., CHAPTER 1 1 THEORY AND PRACTICE: A

GUIDE TO REORGANIZATION 7:206 (1997) (referring to typical "first day" pleadings and
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The E.C.J. decision in Eurofood recognizes that urgent orders may be
required in an insolvency case. For this reason, the E.C.J. acknowledges
that "the specific detailed rules concerning the right to be heard may vary
according to the urgency for a ruling to be given ... ,,332 However, the
E.C.J. states that any restriction based on the urgency of making a decision
must be "surrounded by procedural guarantees ensuring that persons
concerned by such proceedings actually have the opportunity to challenge
the measures adopted in urgency. 333
In the "first day order" context, the "equality of arms" principle
presumably imposes several requirements. First, before the court issues
first day orders, either the parties or the court must provide maximum
reasonable notice consistent with the urgencies of the case to the major
unsecured creditors, any affected secured creditors, and any supervisory
governmental authorities. Second, any such order issued by the court must
be temporary, insofar as possible, and limited to what the debtor needs to
continue in business (or the administrator needs to preserve the estate) for
the first few weeks (perhaps a month) of the case. The court should then
schedule further proceedings to consider additional relief for the debtor and
the affected creditors, at which time all parties in interest can enjoy the full
measure of their "equality of arms" rights.
Balancing considerations of fair procedure and public policy, the
E.C.J. stated that the referring court (i.e., the Irish Supreme Court) may
refuse to recognize insolvency proceedings opened in another E.U. country
where "the decision to open the proceedings was taken in flagrant breach of
the fundamental right to be heard., 334 In making its "flagrant breach"
determination, the E.C.J. cautioned the Irish Supreme Court not to insist
that a fair legal process requires an oral hearing, 3 and stated that the court
"must assess, having regard to the whole of the circumstances, whether or
not the provisional liquidator.., was given sufficient opportunity to be
heard" in the Parma court.336

On the issue of fair procedure, the impact in the Eurofood cases of the
E.C.J. decision is not clear. The Irish Supreme Court and the Dublin High
Court were both very seriously concerned with the procedures followed by
orders).
332 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 1 66.
333Id.

334Id.

67.
335It is uncertain why the E.C.J. included this particular caution in its decision. The
decision of the Irish Supreme court is in two parts, one part referring five questions for
preliminary ruling to the E.C.J. and a second relating to the recognition of the Parma court.
There is nothing in either of these decisions giving undue importance to the hearing and oral
argument in Parma, as opposed to the entire procedure leading to its decision to open a main
proceeding for Eurofood. See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1.
336 See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 68.
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the court in Parma. It is difficult to predict whether, "having regard to the
whole of the circumstances," the Irish Supreme Court will decide that the
procedures in the Parma court were in flagrant breach of Mr. Farrell's right
to be heard, and to deny recognition of the Italian decision to open a main
case for Eurofood.
The "equality of arms" principle is particularly relevant to the
procedures applied in the Eurofood cases in Italy and in Ireland. The E.C.J.
does not spell out the details of the application of the "equality of arms"
principle in the Eurofood cases. However, many of the consequences of the
application of this principle are quite clear.
1. The Parma Hearing
In the Parma court, Mr. Farrell was denied his rights under the
"equality of arms" rule in two respects. First, he was not given adequate
time to file papers (presumably in Italian) in the Parma court to present
what he considered the relevant facts and law for the court to consider in
deciding where Eurofood's CoMI was located. Mr. Farrell received notice
in Dublin at 5:15 p.m. on Friday afternoon, February 13, 2004, of the
hearing scheduled for noon the following Tuesday, February 17 in Parma
(following a holiday Monday). During this time, Mr. Farrell was first
required to obtain authorization from the Dublin High Court to hire Italian
counsel, and then he had to engage such counsel. Counsel then had to be
instructed in the facts of the case and research the law. In addition, counsel
had to try to find out what Dr. Bondi had filed in support of his application
in the Parma court. Finally, counsel had to file appropriate papers on Mr.
Farrell's behalf. This was far more than could be reasonably accomplished
on a holiday weekend. The fact that the Parma court gave Mr. Farrell
nearly two days to file additional papers after the hearing did not ameliorate
this problem to any substantial extent.
In addition, Mr. Farrell was not given a full and fair opportunity to
comment on Dr. Bondi's submissions to the court. The right to comment
implies a corollary right to receive copies of an opponent's submissions.
However, Mr. Farrell was not provided copies of Dr. Bondi's submissions
at all, even though he requested them. In consequence, he was severely
handicapped in determining what arguments to make and what evidence to
present on behalf of the Eurofood bankruptcy estate in Ireland. This was a
clear violation of the "equality of arms" principle.
2. The Dublin Hearing
In stark contrast to the procedure in the Parma court, the Dublin High
Court provided Dr. Bondi nearly a month to hire and instruct counsel in
Ireland and to file appropriate factual evidence and legal arguments. Dr.
Bondi thus had a full and fair opportunity in the Dublin court to present the
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facts in support of his contention that Eurofood's CoMI was located in
Italy, to present his legal arguments in support thereof, and to comment on
the submissions made on behalf of Mr. Farrell.
E. Broader Implications of the Application of "Equality of Arms"
The application of the "equality of arms" principle by the E.C.J. has
broader implications.
This discussion has thus far focused on the
application of the principle of "equality of arms." The E.C.J.'s Eurofood
decision implies that the entire panoply of fair legal process rights applies
to proceedings under the E.U. Regulation in the domestic courts of each
E.U. country. 33

This includes all of the other procedural rights under

Article 6 of the ECHR.338 These rights presumably include the right to a
fair and public hearing, held within a reasonable time and before a fair and
impartial tribunal, and the public pronouncement of judgment. 339 If any of
these rights is not respected in a judgment under the E.U. Regulation
opening a main insolvency proceeding, that judgment does not command
automatic recognition in the courts of the other E.U. countries.
F. "Equality of Arms" in Other E.U. Countries
Italy is far from the most problematic E.U. country whose insolvency
procedures raise "equality of arms" issues. For example, the procedures
followed by the English courts fall shorter of the requirement of "equality
of arms" than those applied in the Parma court.
For example, in the English Daisytek cases,340 on the day that cases
were filed for sixteen European subsidiaries, the High Court in Leeds held
that fourteen had their CoMIs in England.34 ' Most important for this
discussion, there is no evidence that any creditor received any notice of the
hearing or was given any opportunity to be heard, to present its own
evidence, or to rebut the Daisytek management evidence.342 It is quite
...See id. 65-68.
338 This is not a new development of E.C.J. jurisprudence. The E.C.J. itself cites four
cases supporting this proposition: see Case C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe v. Comm'n, 1998
E.C.R. 11-8417,
20-21; Joined Cases C-174/98 and C-189/98, Netherlands v. Comm'n,
2000 E.C.R. 11-1, 17; Case C-7/98, Krombach, 2000 E.C.R. 11-1935,
19-21.
339See ECHR, supra note 145, art. 6(1).
340 Daisytek-Leeds, supra note 330.
341At the request of counsel for the debtors, the court deferred a decision on the location
of the CoMI for the subsidiaries incorporated in Scotland and in Northern Ireland. See
Daisytek-Leeds, supra note 330, at * 1.
342 The French Cour de Cassation apparently waited to make its ruling on the appeal of
the French Daisytek case until the E.C.J. made its ruling in Eurofood-E.C.J. See Cass.com.,
June 27, 2006, Bull. civ. IV, No. 923, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/
RechercheSimpleCass.jsp (enter "03-19863" for "Num~ro d'affaire" and click "Rechercher"
button; then follow "Cour de Cassation..." hyperlink). While the Cour de Cassation
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appropriate, in my view, that the court may not require notice before
opening the insolvency cases: indeed, under U.S. law, the opening of a
voluntary insolvency case is automatic upon the filing of a petition by an
authorized representative of the debtor.34 However, the CoMI decision is
enormously important, and should not be made in haste without satisfying
the procedural requirements of the "equality of arms" principle.
How quickly does the CoMI decision need to be made? It certainly is
a decision of substantial importance in an insolvency case, because it
determines which country will provide both the substantive law and the
procedures that will govern the case, as well as the forum where the issues
arising in the case will be decided. Thus, the CoMI decision should not be
delayed longer than is necessary to give notice to the principal creditors and
parties in interest.
In my view, the Dublin court got the timing right. It scheduled the
hearing on the CoMI decision on March 2, 2004, approximately a month
after the initial insolvency filing on January 27. 4 This provided sufficient
time for the parties in interest to exercise their "equality of arms" rights: a
full briefing of the issues, presentation of their own views of the relevant
facts and the applicable law, and comments on the presentations of
opponents.
G. The Future of "Equality of Arms" in U.S. Law
I should not leave a discussion of the "equality of arms" principle
without addressing whether it might be adopted in U.S. law, especially in
the insolvency law arena.
It is quite unlikely that the concept will be adopted in U.S. law.
Existing U.S. case law construes the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution to provide the same
procedural rights. Thus, the United States has no need for a new concept
for rights that are already fully protected.
The protection of the "equality of arms" elements in U.S. law is most
applied the E.C.J. ruling on the public policy exception of Article 26 of the E.U. Regulation,
it made no mention of the "equality of arms" ruling. Conceivably, the Cour de Cassation
could have held that the Daisytek-Leeds decision did not meet the "equality of arms"
requirements, and thus did not require recognition by the French courts. However, this issue
was probably not before that court, and likely was not argued by the parties in their briefs
filed before the Eurofood-E.C.J.decision was issued.
341See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2005).
344It is also noteworthy that Mr. Farrell, the provisional administrator that the Dublin
court appointed in Eurofood-Dublin on January 27, 2004, gave immediate notice to Dr.
Bondi, the administrator of the Italian Parmalat cases, of the March 4, 2004 hearing. See
Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at *4. In contrast, Dr. Bondi failed to give notice of the
hearing in Parma (despite instructions by the court there) until all of the working days in the
intervening interval had passed. Id.
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clear in the criminal context. The first element, the right to present one's
own evidence to a trier of fact, is well established in U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 345 The right to the assistance of counsel, protected by the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, includes the second element of
"equality of arms," the right to have counsel make a proper argument on the
evidence and the applicable law in a defendant's favor.34 6
The third element of "equality of arms" is covered in two lines of U.S.
cases. The right to comment on an opponent's arguments is implied in the
right to the assistance of counsel. In addition, due process includes the right
to examine witnesses presented in opposition.347 These rights apply in civil
348
contexts as well as criminal, including in the bankruptcy context as well.
VI. ANALYSIS
I previously wrote, while the E.C.J. Eurofood decision was pending,
that the E.U. Regulation needs both substantive and procedural
improvements to provide adequately for a fair and reasonable decision
making process in the determination of the CoMI of a business entity. 349 I
argued that the E.U. Regulation needs substantive revisions to define better
the factors to consider in the CoMI analysis, and to accommodate
insolvency cases for corporate groups such as the Parmalat group. 350 I also
argued that the E.U. Regulation needs a set of procedural improvements,
including procedures for making the CoMI determination, a better
definition of what constitutes a "judgment opening insolvency
proceedings," which is entitled to automatic recognition 351 and a package of
"due process" rights. 352 More generally, I argued that the E.U. Regulation
e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (attempted murder conviction);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (murder conviction).
346 See, e.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 859-60 (1975) (attempted robbery
345 See,

conviction).
347 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (reversing a conviction by a single
judge sitting as a grand jury, who issued a summary conviction for contempt of court
immediately after receiving testimony from the defendant).
348 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989) ("[C]ivil
litigants in federal court share equally the protections of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ( "[Due
process] requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections"); Am. Sur. Co. v.
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932) ("Due process requires that there be an opportunity to
present every available defense"); Am. Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 179 F.2d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir.
1949) ("[T]he guarantee of a hearing implied in the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment applies as well to a hearing on issues of fact as to hearings on issues of law.").
349 See Bufford, supra note 292, at 464-84.
350 See id. at 464-71.
351 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 16(1).
352 See Bufford, supra note 292, at 471-84.
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needs procedural rules for its application.353
Part V has discussed the E.C.J.'s resolution of some of the procedural
issues under the concept of "equality of arms." I now consider the extent to
which the E.C.J. Eurofood decision has resolved the remaining issues.
A. Substantive Issues
In Eurofood-E.C.J., the E.C.J. addressed both of the substantive issues
that I raised, the application of the CoMI analysis and the treatment of
corporate groups. In addition, the E.C.J. made a firm ruling on the
applicability of the public policy provision and the circumstances where it
may be appropriate to apply this provision in the context of determining the
location of a debtor's CoMI. In Part IV, supra, I examined the E.C.J.'s
clarification of the proper focus of the CoMI analysis.35 4
I turn now to the other substantive issues raised in the E.C.J.'s
Eurofood decision. These issues include the scope of the public policy
provision in the E.U. Regulation, and whether it may be invoked in a case
like the Eurofood cases, and the treatment of corporate groups. I also
discuss the application of the E.U. Regulation to a debtor in possession,
authorized by the laws of an E.U. country, in an insolvency proceeding
opened in such a country.
1. PublicPolicy Provision
The E.U. Regulation provides that a court may deny recognition of a
foreign main bankruptcy proceeding on public policy grounds.355 As the
Irish Supreme Court has shown in Eurofood-Ireland, it could possibly be
proper to invoke the public policy provision where a court in another
country has followed unfair procedures in declaring a proceeding to be a
main proceeding.3 56 The Irish Supreme Court found that major due process
violations by the Parma court in deciding that its Eurofood proceeding was
the main proceeding required the
357 denial of recognition of the Italian
decision on public policy grounds.
The E.C.J. held in Eurofood-E.C.J.that recourse to the public policy
exception in Article 26 is reserved for exceptional cases.358 In making this
ruling, the E.C.J. brought the E.U. Regulation under the umbrella of its

353 See id.
354 See supra text accompanying notes 212-29.

355 See E.U. Reg art. 26; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 10, art. 6.
356 See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 17-19; Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip op.
at 30-32.
357 See supra, text at notes 175-82.

358 See Eurofood-E.CJ., supra note 1,
E.C.R. 1-1935,
19, 21).

62 (citing Case C-7/98, Krombach, [2000]
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jurisprudence (case law) on the enforcement of judgments under the
Brussels Convention on the Enforcement of Judgments, in which it had held
that this exception may be invoked:
[O]nly where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered
in another Contracting State would be at variance to an unacceptable
degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is
sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle. The
infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach
of a rule of
359
law regarded as fundamental within that legal order.
The E.C.J. held that case law equally applies to the interpretation of Article
26 of the E.U. Regulation.360
The E.C.J. clearly set a high bar to invoking the public policy
exception: the infringement must be "at variance to any unacceptable
degree" with the legal order, and must constitute a "manifest breach" of a
fundamental rule of law.36 1 Thus, as a general principle, the public policy
exception to the mandatory recognition of the opening of an insolvency
proceeding in another E.U. country or the enforcement of any judgment in
such a proceeding may be invoked only in extraordinary situations where
the infringement "constitute[s] a manifest breach of a rule of law considered
fundamental within that legal order." 362 While the E.C.J. did not decide
whether the Irish Supreme Court could properly invoke the public policy
provision to deny recognition of the opening of the Italian main insolvency
proceeding for Eurofood (because this conclusion was beyond the scope of
the questions submitted), the clear implication is that the E.C.J. would not
consider this a proper case to invoke public policy.
This narrow construction of the public policy provision in Article 26 is
consistent with the view that a judicial decision should not rest solely on
public policy grounds when it can be based on other grounds. Because the
E.C.J. found that the procedural issues could be resolved based on the
"equality of arms" principle, it found that it was not necessary to invoke the
public policy provision in the Eurofood case.

359Id. 63 (citing Krombach, 77 23, 37).
360 Id. 64.
361

Id. 63.

The French Cour de Cassation applied this reasoning in its decision on the appeal of
the Daisytek case from the Versailles Court of Appeal. Cass. com., June. 27, 2006, Bull. civ.
IV, No. 923, 5 (2006), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.friWAspad/
RechercheSimpleCass.jsp (holding that the failure to hear representatives of the workers
does not constitute such a manifest violation of fundamental rights that a French court may
deny recognition of an order from a court of another E.U. member country on the grounds of
public policy under Article 26 of the E.U. Insolvency Regulation).
362
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This approach to the public policy provision makes good sense.363
Public policy is an amorphous and rather undefined basis for a judicial
decision, and the results of invoking public policy are especially
unpredictable. In contrast, the "equality of arms" principle invokes specific
legal standards that can be applied with reasonably predictable results.
2. CorporateGroups
Perhaps the most unsatisfying feature of the E.C.J.'s Eurofood
decision is its failure to deal in any fashion with the international venue
problem of the reorganization of corporate groups such as the Parmalat
group. The E.C.J. stated that "each debtor constituting a distinct legal
entity is subject to its own court jurisdiction. '' 364 In consequence, the CoMI
of each legal entity must be determined separately from the CoMI of any
This separate determination
related entity in the corporate group.
determines the proper national venue for the main proceeding for that
particular entity under the E.U. Regulation.
Virtually all multinational corporate empires are corporate groups, not
single corporations. Indeed, there are often hundreds of legally separate
entities, 365 and they may be doing business in scores of countries. 366 Some
of them operate independent businesses. Others are integral parts of a
larger business operation. Still others fall in between.36 7
363 United States law is similar on the subject of avoiding constitutional adjudication if a
case can be resolved on other grounds. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300
(2001), where the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "[l]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of
the statute is fairly possible, we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems."
Id. at 299-300. (quotations and citation omitted).
364Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 30.
365 The Mercedes Benz-Chrysler corporate empire, for example, includes nearly a
thousand separate legal entities. See DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG, STATEMENTS OF INVESTMENTS
http://www.
COMPANIES
(2001),
AND
RELATED
ASSOCIATED
IN
AFFILIATED,

daimlerchrysler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/829786_313e-kurz.pdf. When BCCI
Holdings collapsed in 1991, it was doing business in sixty-nine countries. See Panama v.
BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 939 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (dismissing claims
by foreign government against foreign entities on forum non conveniens grounds).
366 Parmalat involved some 260 affiliated entities doing business in thirty countries. See
Claudio Celani, The Story Behind Parmalat'sBankruptcy, 31 Executive Intelligence Rev.,
Jan. 16, 2004, available at http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2004/3102parmalat
invest.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) (Parmalat had a networking 260 offshore entities);
Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 1, at 3 (Parmalat operated in more than thirty countries
worldwide).
367For a similar proposal, although somewhat different in its details, see Robert van
Galen, The EuropeanInsolvency Regulation and Groups of Companies (2004), INSOL EUR.
ANN. CONGRESS, (2003), http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european-union/articles.htm.#
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A corporate group can normally deal with the financial difficulties of a
particular member of the group (unless it is the principal operating entity) in
the ordinary course of business. Thus, it is unusual for a single member of
a corporate group to file an insolvency proceeding. However, if the entire
group encounters financial difficulty, as happened with the Parmalat group,
a group-wide solution to the financial problems is often required. In
consequence, many of the group members will typically have to file
insolvency proceedings.
The E.U. Regulation does not address the problem of corporate groups.
It assumes that each legal entity should be evaluated separately to determine
the location of its CoMI, which is the proper venue for its main insolvency
proceeding. 368 More specifically, the E.U. Regulation does not authorize
the filing or opening of a main proceeding for a particular company in a
specific country because a parent company or other affiliate has opened a
main proceeding in that country. 369 The E.U. Regulation makes no
provision for any degree of cooperation between proceedings for
37 related
entities, 370 and it makes no provision for substantive consolidation. 1
This approach is unsatisfactory because a corporate group that is an
integrated economic unit can only be reorganized or liquidated efficiently if
the reorganization is done collectively for the entire group. 372 If the legal
regime for the insolvency cases of corporate groups were to permit the
filing of insolvency proceedings in the same venue for all of the group
articles.
368 See, e.g., id. (proposing revisions to the E.U. Regulation to provide for joint
bankruptcy proceedings for corporate groups); E.C.J. A.G. Opinion, supra note 21;
Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 117 ("[E]ach subsidiary in a group must be considered
individually."); Wessels, Insolvency Proceedings,supra note 19, at 18-20 (stating that the
E.U. Regulation "offers no rule for groups of affiliated companies"); see also Virg6s &
Schmit, supra note 21, 76.
369 It appears that the European Regulation authorizes a liquidator in a main proceeding
to open a secondary proceeding for a related entity in the same country, notwithstanding that
the related entity's CoMI is located elsewhere. See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 29,
pmbl. 19.

370 See, e.g., MOSS ET AL., supra note 12,

8.56.

311 See id.
372 If the subsidiary is not economically integrated into the corporate group and can stand
on its own, it can be reorganized separately. Such separate reorganization has been
accomplished or is in process for several of the Parmalat subsidiaries. See, e.g., Press
Release, Senator Schumer, Parmalat Decision to Not Sell U.S. Assets Both Preserves
Competition
for
Farmers
and
Helps
Prevent
Milk
Price
Hikes,
http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press-releases/2004/PR2637.Parm
51804.html (announcing restructuring of Parmalat United States operations); Press Release,
Felsberg e Associados, Parmalat Files the First Request for Judicial Restructuring,
http://www.felsberg.com.br/pdf/AlertReestructuring_9_24-06-05.pdf (last visited Jan. 11,
2007) (describing separate reorganization of Parmalat's Brazilian subsidiary in Sao Paulo,
Brazil).
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members, it would be much easier to work out a common solution to the
financial problems of the group. If the proceedings are all filed in one
court, there will be one judge to administer the cases and one set of lawyers
and other professionals. In addition, the insolvency proceedings would all
be governed by one legal regime (except where conflict of laws rules lead
to the application of another country's law) and one set of legal procedures.
In contrast, if proceedings are dispersed in a number of countries, as
happened in Parmalat, a group-wide solution to the financial problems is
much more difficult to negotiate. In addition, there are a variety of judges
and a variety of groups of lawyers and other professionals. Most important,
there are also different applicable legal regimes and different sets of legal
procedures.
Uniformly among the nations, corporate law generally does not
recognize corporate groups as an independent source of corporate rights and
responsibilities. This view finds its roots in the very nature of a corporation
itself. The idea of a corporation is that the risks of the corporate
stakeholders, including the management, the creditors, and the
shareholders, are limited to the activities of the corporation itself. A parent
corporation is simply another shareholder that exercises shareholder rights
under the applicable corporate law. For the parent, the block of shares that
it owns in a subsidiary is simply another corporate asset that it may buy or
sell, and that confer shareholder rights (such as voting on directors and
receiving dividends) on the parent corporation. Business losses of a
subsidiary are isolated there, and are not shared with the corporate
shareholder.
Business successes of the parent are not shared with the subsidiary,
and are not available to cover losses suffered by the subsidiary and its
creditors. Equally, business successes of the subsidiary are not available to
creditors of the parent, except to the extent that the subsidiary pays a
dividend to its shareholders. The failure to observe these norms may result
in the loss of the corporate shield provided under national company law.
This is solid ground, perhaps even solid rock, for business corporation law.
This solid rock of business corporation law is reflected in both the
E.U. Regulation and in the UNCITRAL Model Law. Both require that each
corporate entity be treated separately for all insolvency purposes, including
venue for insolvency proceedings."'
The decisions of the Irish and the Italian courts on the location of
Eurofood's CoMI clearly derived from their disagreement as to the role and
importance of the corporate group in the CoMI decision. The Italian courts
found the location of decision making power in the corporate group to be
decisive. In their view, the location of the command and control structure

' UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 10, art. 29.
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for the Eurofood subsidiary was the dominant consideration on the CoMI
determination. In the view of the Irish courts, in contrast, the views and
expectations of the creditors of the particular corporate entity are more
important than the location of the effective decision makers for the
corporate group.
While this outcome in the E.C.J. Eurofood decision is unsatisfying, the
E.C.J. cannot be faulted for making this decision. The UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency similarly treats each corporate entity
separately for the determination of the CoMI. The problem lies in the
A similar problem inheres in the
drafting of the E.U. Regulation.
A legislative
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.
solution is required for the problem: we should not expect the courts, even
the E.C.J., to fix the legislative problem.
For the European Union, an amendment to the E.U. Regulation would
be required. UNCITRAL has formed a working group to address this issue
for the Model Law, and a proposal is expected in due course.374 Given the
UNCITRAL initiative, the European Union may well await the results of
the UNCITRAL deliberations, and then adopt a similar (if not identical)
solution to this problem. Like the CoMI concept itself, the corporate group
solution to the problem of varying CoMIs should be uniform in both the
Model Law and the E.U. Regulation.
3. Debtor in Possession
The E.U. draft convention on cross-border insolvency, which was
converted into the E.U. Regulation, was written before the debtor in
possession trend had developed in Europe. Thus, the E.U. Regulation
provides that the opening of a case does not qualify for recognition under
the E.U. Regulation unless the applicable law provides for "collective
insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a
debtor and the appointment of a liquidator. '3 75 To avoid any question as to
which national laws qualify under this definition, the E.U. Regulation lists
the qualifying national laws in its Annex A.
The rejection of the model of reorganization with a debtor in
possession was reinforced in the E.C.J. Eurofood decision. In determining
that the Dublin decision appointing Mr. Farrell as a provisional liquidator
on January 27, 2004 was entitled to recognition under Article 16, the E.C.J.
specifically found that this constituted a displacement of management, and
thus qualified under the Article 1(1) definition of "collective insolvency

374 See Press Release, UNCITRAL, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law
Concludes 39th Session in New York, U.N. Doc. UNIS/L/102 (Jul. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2006/unisl 102.html.
375 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
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proceedings." 376
The reorganization of a firm under the aegis of insolvency law was
pioneered by the United States.3 77
According to that policy, the
reorganization of a business often is best carried out by the old
management, if it is not incompetent or corrupt. 378 In contrast, in the U.S.
experience, an administrator who comes from outside rarely knows enough
about the firm to lead a successful reorganization. This policy was born in
the Great Depression, when businesses failed principally because of the
general economic conditions, and not because of any fault in the
management of the particular firm. This policy was extended to all
reorganization provisions under the bankruptcy law in 1979. 379
In recent years, a trend has developed for other countries to adopt the
debtor in possession model for business reorganizations. For example,
Canada's Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which went into force in 1994,
provides for the debtor to remain in possession in a reorganization case.380
More recently, Japan has adopted the debtor in possession system for the
reorganization of small firms under its Civil Rehabilitation Act. 381
Before 2006, there was no E.U. insolvency law that provided for the
reorganization of a business with a debtor in possession. This has now
changed. The new French insolvency law now provides a procedure for the
reorganization of a business where the old management remains in place.38 2
376

See id.

377See Act of June 7, 1934, Pub. L. No. 296, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912 (1934) (amending

Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to provide for corporate reorganizations).
378 See id.
379See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Star. 2549 (1978)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1531 (2006) and in scattered other titles of the
U.S. Code.).
380 See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3 (1985), R.S.C., ch. 27, sec. 2
(1992). In addition, Canada's Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., ch. C 36
(1985), a statute dating from the 1930s and is more popular for the reorganization of large
businesses, has authorized debtor management to remain in control of the business during
reorganization.
38 See Civil Rehabilitation Act [CRA], Law No. 255 of 1999, ch. XIII, sec. 1, (amended
by Laws 2004), translatedin 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 80, 129 (2001), Laws No. 45, 98,

and 100 of 2002, and Law No. 76 of 2004 [CRA].2335, LS 89 (2004) (Japan). For the
overview of the CRA, see Masafumi Kodama, The New Japanese Reorganization
Procedures, Am. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2001, at 18; Kent Anderson, Small Business
Reorganizations: An Examination of Japan's Civil Rehabilitation Act Considering U.S.
Policy Implications and Foreign Creditors' PracticalInterests, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355
(2001). For a comparison of the Civil Rehabilitation Act Law (and U.S. law) with the
Corporate Reorganization Act, Corporate Reorganization Act, Law No. 154 of 2002,
amending Law No. 172 of 1952, amended by Law No. 76 of 2004 (RA) (Japan), see Hon.
Samuel L. Bufford & Kazuhiro Yanagida, Japan's Revised Laws on Business
Reorganization:An Analysis, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (2006).
382 See C. COM. art. L 621-4, available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?
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B. Procedural Issues
Many of the venue problems that have arisen in the administration of
international insolvency proceedings in recent years have resulted from
inadequate procedural rules. In Part V, supra, I examined in detail the
E.C.J.'s use of the principle of "equality of arms" to deal with the due
process type of procedural issues referred to it by the Irish Supreme
Court.3 83 This principle permitted the E.C.J. to address these procedural

issues without invoking the public policy provision of Article 26 of the E.U.
Regulation.384 We turn now to those procedural issues that fall outside the
scope of "equality of arms."
Procedural issues are crucial to the determination of a debtor's CoMI,
and in consequence the proper national venue for the main proceeding for
an international company. The result of such a determination is substantial:
it determines which country's laws will, for the most part, govern the rights
of creditors and other interested parties in the proceeding; for most issues
in the main proceeding, the governing law is the law of the country where
the main proceeding is opened.3 86 The choice of forum governs such rights
as the scope of the automatic stay or moratorium and the opportunities for
relief therefrom, the availability of interim relief pending the opening of an
insolvency proceeding, the rights of workers in the proceeding, the priority
of claims, and the right to reorganize and the procedures attendant thereto,
including the voting requirements for approval of a reorganization plan.
Thus, a procedure is needed to guarantee a full and fair consideration of the
issues that determine the location of the CoMI.
The E.U. Regulation is notably lacking in procedural rules. The
strategy of the E.U. Regulation is to rely on domestic procedural rules to
govern E.U. Regulation procedures. Because each of the E.U. member
countries has a domestic bankruptcy law, this strategy is largely well
founded. However, the E.U. Regulation contains distinctive substantive
and procedural provisions that are not reflected in domestic bankruptcy
procedures, and which need supplementary procedural rules.

lang=uk&c=32&r=3155 (providing that no administrator need be appointed in a case where
the number of employees is below a threshold set by regulation. That threshold is twenty
employees and annual revenues of€3 million. See Decree No. 2005-1677 of Dec. 28, 2005,
Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 29,

2005, p. 20324, art. 53, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=
749460&indice = &table=JORF&ligneDeb = 1).
383 See supra text accompanying notes 286-343.
384 See supra text accompanying notes 330-37.
385 See supra text accompanying notes 24-37.

386 See E.U. Regulation, supra note 3, art. 4 (stating that the law of the forum state
governs an international insolvency proceeding governed by the E.U. Regulation, except to
the extent that the E.U. Regulation provides otherwise).
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Because the procedural rules would specifically apply to rights under
the E.U. Regulation, the procedural rules should be adopted at the E.U.
level.
Presumably, the European Union has the power to issue a
supplementary procedural regulation to establish procedures for the
application of the E.U. Regulation in the national courts of the member
countries. The E.C.J. has filled in this gap to a certain extent with the
application of the "equality of arms" principle in its Eurofood-E.CJ
decision. However, the other procedural issues raised in this Article remain
to be addressed.
The application of the E.U. Regulation to date shows that it needs
three important additional procedural improvements to make it workable.
The first major improvement needed is the adoption of procedures
governing a decision on the location of the debtor's CoMI, which, in turn,
determines the country where a main proceeding should be located. In
particular, this decision must be delinked from the decision to open an
insolvency proceeding and other "first day" orders. The procedures need to
provide a fair venue hearing, on notice to all creditors and other interested
parties, and an opportunity to be heard, as required by the "equality of
arms" principle applied by the E.C.J. in its Eurofood decision.
The second major improvement is to adopt a definition of the
"opening" of a proceeding, to provide for the procedures under the laws of
countries such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, which do not include a
traditional judicial order or judgment opening an insolvency proceeding.
The third set of procedural reforms needed fall generally under the
category of "due process." Procedural rights needed to implement the
"equality of arms" principle include: (a) advance notice of important
hearings in a proceeding (including the decision on the CoMI), (b) requiring
the provision of copies of relevant papers for a hearing, (c) recognizing a
right for all parties in interest (including foreign liquidators) to be heard and
to present evidence, (d) granting a right to appeal, including a right to
consideration by the E.C.J., and (e) coordinating procedural rules in the
various countries so that no party obtains a procedural advantage by virtue
of filing in a particular country with more efficient procedural rules.
In contrast, under Chapter 15, the U.S. domestication of the
UNCITRAL Model Law,387 the procedural situation is more favorable. In
addition to the bankruptcy code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
provide a substantial set of procedural rules promulgated by the U.S.
Supreme Court (on the recommendation of the U.S. Judicial Conference
and its committees, and with the consent of Congress). While the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure do not presently include rules for the

387

See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.

109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2006).
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application of the provisions in Chapter 15, these rules are in the drafting
process.388 In addition, many federal judicial districts have adopted
substantial local procedural rules for their bankruptcy courts that
supplement the federal rules. 389 The procedural insufficiencies of the E.U.
Regulation thus can be avoided in the United States by the promulgation of
appropriate additions to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
1.Proceduresfor Determining CoMI
The inadequacy of E.U. procedural rules for applying the E.U.
Regulation is particularly important in the decisions on the location of the
CoMI in the Eurofood proceedings. The timing of the CoMI decision needs
to be delayed to a certain extent, so that the quality of the evidence for the
decision can be improved and the parties in interest can be heard. The
timing of the decisions in Italy and Ireland to determine where Eurofood's
CoMI was located is examined in connection
with the above discussion on
390
the principle of "equality of arms."
a. Procedures in Other Countries for Deciding CoMI
The impact of the E.C.J.'s remarks on "fair procedures" is likely to be
enormous. The procedures followed by the Italian courts in the Italian
Eurofood case fall seriously short of the E.C.J. requirements. However,
procedures in other countries, such as the United Kingdom (England) and
France in past decisions determining the CoMI for debtors, are much more
unsatisfactory than those followed by the Italian courts in the Eurofood
case.
For example, it is apparently the practice of the English courts to
decide whether to open a main insolvency case as a first day order, which is
issued with no notice to creditors whatsoever. 39 1 None of the Daisytek
decisions to open a main proceeding for its French and German subsidiaries
provided even as much notice and opportunity to be heard as the Parma
court provided in Eurofood. In Leeds, the first day hearings resulted
in
392
decisions to open main proceedings for fourteen Daisytek affiliates.
For
the French and German affiliates, apparently no notice was provided to their
388It takes approximately three years for the promulgation of revisions to the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Thus, it will be several years before the new rules
governing Chapter 15 practice to come into force.
389 See, e.g., Local Bankruptcy Rules, Central District of California, Bankr. C.D. Cal. R.

1001-1 to 9075-1 (2005). The Central District of California is in the process of adopting a
local rule governing proceedings under Chapter 15 of the U.S. bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1531 (2006).
390 See supra text accompanying notes 306-12.
391See, e.g., Daisytek-Leeds, supra note 330.
392 See supra text accompanying notes 335-47.
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French or German creditors or employees. French law required that notice
be given to Daisytek-France's 145 French employees, 393 who had
substantial rights under French law, including the right to be heard before
the opening of an insolvency proceeding 394 and the right to a representative
in the insolvency process. 395 For all we know, if the parties in interest from
France and Germany had been given notice, an opportunity to be heard, and
an opportunity to present evidence, the evidence on which the Leeds court
made its findings as to the location of the CoMIs of the relevant subsidiaries
may have been controverted.
In the proceeding filed for Daisytek-France in Pontoise, no notice was
given to the English administrators (and apparently not to any creditors,
either) before the Pontoise Commercial Court ordered the opening of a
main proceeding. 96 However, both the workers and the public prosecutor
were given notice and appeared.3 97 There appears to be no reason why the
English administrators could not have been given notice: if they had known
The English
of the hearing, they likely would have appeared.
administrators appeared afterwards on a motion to intervene,398 which the
Pontoise court denied.399
My view is that a decision on whether a proceeding is a main
proceeding or a secondary proceeding should be delayed for a month or two
after notice of the filing is given to creditors, to provide both notice of a
hearing on this issue and an opportunity to be heard to all of the parties in
interest.400
The notice should also go to those administrators and
committees of creditors (if there are any) that have already been appointed
393 See C.

COM. art. L 621-4, available at http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?
lang-uk&c=32&r=3155.
394 See id.
'9' See id. art. L 621-8.
396 See Klempka v. SAS ISA-Daisytek, Judgment of May 26, 2003, 8th Ch., Trib. de
comm. Pointoise (Daisytek-Pontoise), rev'd on other grounds, Klempka v. ISA Daisytek
SAS, 2003 WL 22936778, [2004] I.L. Pr. 6 (C d'A 2003) (Fr.) (Daisytek-Versailles), affd,
Cass. com., June. 27, 2006, Bull. civ. IV, No. 03-19863, available at http://www.legi
france.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleCass.jsp.
397 See id.

398 A decision on opening an insolvency case is best made at the earliest possible time,
which may limit the notice given and the opportunity to appear. In its Eurofood-E.C.J.
decision, the E.C.J. recognizes the need for making some decisions in insolvency cases on
little or no notice. See Eurofood-E.C.J., supra note 1, 66. In such circumstances, the
E.C.J. stated, procedural guarantees are required to assure that "persons concerned by such
proceedings actually have the opportunity to challenge the measures adopted in urgency."
Id.
399 See Daisytek-Versailles, supra note 396, at *3.
400 But see MOSS ET AL., supra note 12, 8.148 (stating that English procedural forms
require a decision, at the time of opening, on whether the proceeding is a main or a
secondary proceeding). I disagree with the timing of this decision.
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in proceedings in other countries (whether inside or outside the European
Union) with respect to either the same corporate entity or a related entity.
The law should further provide that such administrators and committees, as
well as creditors in those related insolvency proceedings, have standing to
be heard on the decision of opening a main or a secondary proceeding.
b. Nature and Quality of Evidence on CoM
Courts must make their decisions based on the evidence presented to
them. Courts are simply not at liberty to search out their own evidence, or
even to tell the parties what evidence to present. Given the presumption
that a corporation's CoMI is found where its registered office is located, 40 1
evidence of the location of its registered office should be sufficient unless a
party in interest contests the application of the presumption. It is clear that
the evidence presented to the Parma court in the Eurofood proceeding
differed markedly from the evidence presented to the Dublin court. The
remedy for this problem lies in giving the parties enough time to collect and
present the relevant evidence before making a decision on the CoMI.4 2
Italian courts are far from the worst offenders in limiting the
opportunity of the parties in interest to be heard effectively before a court
makes a decision on the location of a debtor's CoMI for the purposes of
opening a main insolvency proceeding. It is true that Mr. Farrell did not
have much opportunity to hire counsel to appear at the hearing, had little
opportunity to see the documents that Dr. Bondi filed in the Parma court,
and had limited opportunity to present his own evidence on the subject.
Nonetheless, in all of these respects, his procedural rights exceeded those
routinely provided in English courts when they make decisions on the
location of a debtor's CoMI.
The nature and quality of the evidence supporting a decision to open a
main proceeding is very important. It appears that, in the Eurofood
proceedings, the high court in Dublin was the only first instance court with
quality evidence to support this decision. While the Dublin court appointed
a temporary liquidator on an ex parte motion based only on an unopposed
affidavit of the managing director of Bank of America,
it postponed the
decision on whether the proceeding qualified as a main proceeding for two
months, so that the Italian administrator would have a full opportunity to be
heard.
The evidence before the Dublin High Court on the first day of the
Eurofood proceeding was much more limited. The court based its decision
to appoint Mr. Farrell as provisional liquidator on a lengthy affidavit
401 See supra notes 215-29 and accompanying text.
402 See supranotes 306-12 and accompanying text.
403 Eurofood-Dublin,supra note 1, slip. op. at 6.
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presented by Wayne Porritt, the managing director of Bank of America
NA 44 In part, the affidavit expressed the bank's concern that Parmalat
may appoint new directors, replace the existing Irish directors, and take
other actions that could result in relocating Eurofood's CoMI abroad.40 5
There is no reflection in the court's decision that the decision to appoint a
temporary administrator was so urgent that it could not postpone this
decision for at least two or three days to give the creditors and other parties
in interest an opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence.
The Leeds Court's decision to open a main proceeding for DaisytekFrance does not disclose the evidence submitted to support its decision.
Apparently, the only evidence provided to the Leeds court was a fairly
detailed affidavit from the chief executive officer of Daisytek-ISA Ltd., the
master English holding company for the European Daisytek enterprise, that
was filed with the bankruptcy petition.40 6 Finally, it is fair to assume that
the Leeds court did not allocate much time to hearing or examining the
evidence as to the French and German Daisytek subsidiaries, because the
court made similar decisions in fourteen Daisytek proceedings that day.40 7
The evidence submitted by Dr. Bondi to the Parma court, on which the
court based its decision to open a main proceeding for Eurofood, was
apparently extensive: the papers included nineteen exhibits. The procedural
transgression of Dr. Bondi was that he never provided copies of the papers
to the Irish liquidator (either before or after the hearing in Parma).
After
the hearing, the court gave the English administrators only thirty hours,
which was clearly insufficient, to file any supplemental evidence or
arguments.409

The French commercial court that decided to open a competing main
proceeding for Daisytek-France in Pontoise had somewhat more, albeit also
one-sided, evidence in support of its decision. Bruce Robinson, the
Daisytek-France president, presented a declaration in writing and orally
confirmed that the high court in Leeds had opened a bankruptcy proceeding
404 See id. at 6.
405 See id. at 7.
406 See Daisytek-Leeds, supra note 330, at * 1-*4. A similar procedure was followed in

the Enron Directo case, Chancery Division, 4 July 2002. Enron Directo was a sociedad
limitada incorporated in Spain. It was placed in administration by order of a London court
after an ex parte hearing based solely on a witness statement by one of its English directors
and a similar statement by the administrator of an affiliate. See Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction in the U.S. and Europe: Reconsideration Needed 10
(2005), http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2005/13114.pdf.
407 Indeed, in the court's eighteen paragraph decision on the fourteen applications, only
paragraph 17 addresses the facts concerning Daisytek-France's CoMI. See Daisytek-Leeds,
supra note 330, at *4.
408 See Eurofood-Ireland,supra note 1, at 15-16.
41 See id. at 16.
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for Daisytek-France, and that the company was in a state of cessation of
payments. ° Philippe Kersebet, speaking on behalf of the employees,
explained that the workforce was restless because of the opening of the
proceeding in Leeds, and because relations with suppliers were
deteriorating. 4 11 The Daisytek-France financial director also presented
evidence on the tenuous state of the finances of the business. 4 12 Finally, the
public prosecutor opined that the financial situation of the company was
extremely tenuous and that it was close to liquidation.4 13
However, apparently no notice of the hearing was given to the
administrators appointed by the Leeds court, and they did not appear. The
Leeds administrators first appeared in the Pontoise case the next month,
when they filed third-party proceedings to join the French proceeding. The
Pontoise court promptly dismissed their application.
In the German Daisytek proceedings filed in the DOsseldorf County
Court (a small claims court) on May 19, 2003 (the Monday following the
Leeds filings), the only evidence presented was a letter from the sole
Dusseldorf business manager of the three German subsidiaries, to which
was appended the December 31, 2002 financial statement.4 14 The legal
brief relied on the simple assertion that the
4 15 bankruptcy proceedings were
being filed because of "overindebtedness.'
Thus, except in Dublin, all of the evidence presented in the courts of
first instance in the Eurofood and Daisytek proceedings consisted of
unopposed declarations and statements presented in ex parte proceedings
where possible opponents were given either no notice whatsoever (Leeds,
Disseldorf, and Pontoise) or insufficient notice to present an opposition
(Parma). Because they failed to provide an opportunity for opposition,
those courts certainly lacked a balanced presentation of the evidence on the
location of the CoMIs at issue, and much important evidence was likely not
presented.
The standard adopted by the E.C.J. would require that the Pontoise
court defer a decision, if possible, on whether its case is a main proceeding
or a secondary proceeding until notice and an opportunity to be heard is
given. Under the "equality of arms" principle, every party in interest has
the right to present that party's own evidence and legal arguments, and to

410 See Daisytek-Pontoise,supra note 396, slip op. at 2.

id.
id.
See id.
See Mar. 3, 2004, AG Duisseldorf, 501 IN 126/03, slip op. at 1 (F.R.G.).
See id. Overindebtedness, which arises when a debtor's liabilities exceed its assets, is
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comment on the 4 evidence
and legal arguments submitted by the other
16
parties in interest.
If the decision on whether a new case is a main proceeding cannot be
delayed, the court opening the case (or receiving the filing, if opening is
automatic without a court order under local procedure) should be required
to make findings that justify the need to proceed without providing the
"equality of arms" rights to all parties in interest. In such a case, the parties
in interest must be given the opportunity in due course to challenge such a
decision adopted in urgency.
In contrast, it appears that the failure to give notice to the English
administrators in the Disseldorf County Court resulted from the failure of
the Dfisseldorf business manager to inform the court of the Leeds
proceeding. Procedural regulations are unlikely to prevent a party in
interest from misleading the court, where that party fails to provide needed
information in the party's possession.
The adoption of E.U. procedures, implementing the "equality of arms"
principle, to give timely notice and an opportunity to be heard will vastly
improve the quality of evidence presented to an E.U. court making a
decision on whether a proceeding should be a main proceeding based on the
location of the debtor's CoMI.
I have discussed the procedures in the English and French courts
because of the prominent cases where the procedural problems have
become known. It is likely that, to comply with the "equality of arms"
rulings in the Eurofood-E.C.J.decision and with the recommendations here,
many E.U. countries will be required to revise their procedures for the
opening of insolvency cases, and especially for determining whether the
case is a main proceeding for the debtor.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the decision of the E.C.J., issued on May 2,
2006, in the case involving Eurofood IFSC Ltd., an Irish subsidiary of
Parmalat SpA which, together with a number of its affiliates, is in an
extraordinary administration proceeding in Italy. Both Irish and Italian
courts had ruled that Eurofood's CoMI was located in their own country.
The E.C.J. decision responded to five Irish Supreme Court questions and
referred to the E.C.J. as to the proper country to conduct the main
insolvency proceeding for Eurofood, after Irish and Italian courts had each
ruled that Eurofood's CoMI was located in their own country.
The E.C.J. decision resolves three major issues under the E.U.
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings. First, it sided with the Irish courts
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instead of the Italian courts in deciding that the CoMI must be decided from
the viewpoint of third parties (chiefly creditors), and not on the basis of the
country where the effective executive decisions are made. The presumption
of the E.U. Regulation that a corporation's CoMI is located in the country
of its registered office can be rebutted, the E.C.J. ruled, "only if factors
which are both objective and ascertainable by third parties" show that the
CoMI is located elsewhere, as in the case of a "letterbox" company.4 18
The E.C.J. decision also resolved two important procedural issues. In
a major doctrinal change, the E.C.J. imported into insolvency procedure the
E.U. (and Council of Europe) principle of "equality of arms," a subset of
procedural fairness law requiring that each party in interest be given a full
and fair opportunity to present the evidence and legal arguments in support
of that party's position and to comment on an opponent's evidence and
arguments. The Irish Supreme Court is certain to find, if it reaches this
issue, that these requirements were not met in the Parma court's ruling,
which decided that Eurofood's CoMI was located in Italy.
The Irish Supreme Court may not reach this issue, however, because of
the E.C.J.'s second important procedural decision. The E.C.J. held that the
Dublin court's appointment of a provisional liquidator on the date of the
Irish insolvency filing, which predated the Italian proceedings by nearly
two weeks, constituted a "judgment opening insolvency proceedings" that
was entitled to automatic recognition under the E.U. Regulation. The
unanswered question remains whether the Dublin court's later decision that
the previously opened proceedings qualified as main proceedings, and thus
preempted the Parma court from opening a main proceeding for Eurofood
in the interim.
Several other questions remain unanswered after the E.C.J. decision.
The most important remaining substantive issue is the treatment of related
entities in a corporate group with systemic insolvency problems (which
occurred in the Parmalat case). UNCITRAL is commencing a further study
on this issue. Procedural issues remain that arguably fall outside the scope
of "equality of arms," including procedures governing the timing for
making a CoMI determination, the nature and format of evidence to be
presented on this issue, and the fleshing out of procedural rights of the
parties in interest in connection with such a decision.
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